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Notes
TO ENHANCE OR NOT TO ENHANCE: CIVIL
PENALTY ENHANCEMENT FOR PARENTS OF
JUVENILE HATE CRIME OFFENDERS
No one is born hating another person because of the colour of
his skin, or his background, or his religion. People must learn
to hate, and if they can learn to hate, they can be taught to
love, for love comes more naturally to the human heart than
its opposite.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Mr. and Mrs. Smith are firm believers in their pro-choice stance on
abortion.2 Together they attend rallies to actively torment pro-life
Catholics. They allow their seventeen-year-old daughter, Hannah, to
participate in the rallies and express her hatred through violent action.
At a pro-life rally, Hannah grabbs a girl’s neck, throws her to the
ground, and stabbs her in the chest with a knife. Hannah leaves the girl
on the ground where she is later discovered and saved by a passerby.
Afterwards, the girl and other Catholics purposely conceal their faith.
In an unrelated incident, local homosexuals fear for their safety and
intentionally hide their sexuality because of sixteen-year old James
Jenkins. Purposefully targeting another boy because of his sexual
preference, James strangles the boy, drags him by his neck, and attempts
to hang him. Unlike Hannah, James learns to hate homosexuals from his
friends, and not his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Jenkins.
At their trials, the juries find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Hannah’s and James’s crimes were motivated by hatred for Catholics
and homosexuals, respectively.
State law allows for a penalty
enhancement for such “hate crimes,” and Hannah and James were
sentenced accordingly.
Following Hannah’s and James’s convictions for hate crime, the
victims file civil suits against the juveniles’ parents pursuant to the
THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 493 (Elizabeth Knowles ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 5th ed. 1999) (quoting Nelson Mandela’s Long Walk to Freedom).
2
Although this situation is fictional, it presents an introduction to the topics and legal
issues discussed in this Note.
1
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state’s parental liability law. To encourage parents to supervise their
children, this law holds parents liable for damages resulting from their
juveniles’ willful and wanton conduct up to $4,000.
The victims’ attorneys argue for a civil penalty enhancement against
Hannah’s and James’s parents because the crimes were motivated by a
bias against Catholics and homosexuals. In support of their argument,
the attorneys urge that the penalty enhancement reflects the severity of
Hannah’s and James’s hate crimes. Second, the attorneys contend that
the increased penalty would encourage the parents to exert more
supervision and control over Hannah and James, leading to a decrease in
juvenile hate crime.
Finally, the victims’ attorneys argue that juveniles possess a
diminished responsibility, and that the juvenile offenders’ parents
should be held more accountable for their hate crimes. But the court
rejects the attorneys’ arguments, holding that current parental liability
laws do not allow for the application of civil penalty enhancements to
the parents of juvenile hate crime offenders.
Laws that subject offenders to increased punishments show
recognition by legislatures that hate crimes are distinct from other
violent crimes.3 Similarly, parental liability laws indicate legislative
intent to encourage parents to supervise juveniles, and suggest that
parental failure to keep juveniles from committing crimes may be a
legitimate basis to expose parents to liability.4
But the best way to combat hate crime, as opposed to other types of
juvenile crime, would be a combination of enhanced penalty and
parental liability laws, particularly where the law already provides for
additional criminal punishment for hate crime offenders.5 In particular,
an enhanced penalty for the parents of juvenile hate crime offenders
would reflect criminal law’s treatment of hate crime as distinct from
other violent crime.6 Similarly, the threat of an additional penalty would
further encourage parents to supervise juveniles to prevent crime—hate

See infra Part II.A.3 (detailing the three different types of hate crime legislation).
See infra Part II.D (explaining the purpose of parental liability statutes).
5
See infra Part IV (adding a sentence enhancement feature to existing parental liability
laws for parents of a juvenile hate crime offender).
6
See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (defining penalty enhancement statutes
and indicating which states have a penalty enhancement for hate crime offenders).
3
4
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crime in particular—thus increasing the effectiveness of current parental
liability laws.7
Part II of this Note begins with a broad overview of hate crime,
penalty enhancement statutes, juvenile delinquency, and parental
liability laws.8 Next, Part III of this Note analyzes the application of a
civil penalty enhancement to the parents of juvenile hate crime
offenders.9 Finally, Part IV adds a civil penalty enhancement to existing
parental liability laws for parents of juvenile hate crime offenders.10 The
enhanced penalty will reduce hatred by providing parents with an
opportunity to learn acceptance, teach acceptance to their children, and
improve parenting skills. Thus, a reduction of this learned behavior will
decrease the overall number of hate crimes committed by adults and
most importantly juveniles, who would maintain and continue to act
upon a particular hatred without the enhanced penalty.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF HATE CRIME, PENALTY ENHANCEMENT STATUTES,
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, AND PARENTAL LIABILITY LAWS
A review of hate crime, penalty enhancement statutes, juvenile
delinquency, and parental liability laws demonstrates a critical problem
faced by victims of juvenile hate crime: current parental liability laws
inadequately address the origins of this learned behavior and reflect the
severity of hate crimes.11 Part II.A exemplifies these inadequacies
through an exploration of the nature of hate crime, federal and state
statutes, and relevant constitutional challenges to the laws.12 Part II.B
explains the concept of penalty enhancements and the constitutional
challenges to increased sentences, while Part II.C examines the
prevalence of juvenile delinquency, the jurisdiction of juvenile justice

7
See infra Part IV.A (explaining the possible additional penalties for parents of juvenile
hate crime offenders).
8
See infra Part II (showing that hate crime is inherently more severe than ordinary
crime, as recognized through enhanced penalty statutes, however, the overview indicates
that current parental liability laws do not reflect the same mentality, even though juveniles
are common hate crime offenders).
9
See infra Part III (analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of hate crime legislation and
parental liability laws as they apply to parents of juvenile hate crime offenders).
10
See infra Part IV (presenting the additional penalty for parents of juvenile hate crime
offenders).
11
See infra Part II (providing an overview of hate crime, penalty enhancement statutes,
juvenile delinquency, and parental liability laws); infra Part IV (proposing the addition of a
sentence enhancement feature to existing parental liability laws).
12
See infra Part II.A (describing hate crime as inherently more violent than other violent
crime because of the increased effects on victims and society).
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systems, and theories of juvenile misconduct.13 Finally, Part II.D
presents various forms of legislation that hold parents accountable and
relevant constitutional challenges to parental liability laws.14
A. The Background of Hate Crime
As the victims of a hate crime, Hannah’s and James’s victims suffer
severe psychological and physical effects, even when compared to the
victims of other violent crimes.15 Accordingly, various forms of hate
crime legislation may punish Hannah and James solely because their
crimes were committed because of a bias.16 Part II.A.1 provides a broad
overview of hate crime and Part II.A.2 explains that the effects of hate
crimes on the victims and society are inherently more severe compared
to the impacts of other violent crime.17 Finally, Part II.A.3 presents
various forms of federal and state hate crime legislation.18
1.

The Nature of Hate Crime

A hate crime is a crime committed against a victim who is selected
out of hatred for a particular “race, religion, sexual orientation, or
ethnicity.”19 It is described as a “doubly depraved act” because of the

13
See infra Part II.B (indicating that states allow an increase in hate crime offenders’
sentences because of the severity of a hate crime); infra Part II.C (demonstrating the
necessity for parental liability laws which protect victims of juvenile crime from juveniles
unable to satisfy a judgment).
14
See infra Part II.D (discussing how challenges to parental liability laws will likely be
unsuccessful because such laws do not violate the Equal Protection or Due Process clauses
nor are they overbroad).
15
See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text (stating that the increased effects on hate
crime victims include suppressing religious beliefs, decreased self-esteem, and isolating
victims).
16
See infra Part II.A.3 (presenting legislation that provides a punishment for hate crime
offenders).
17
See infra Part II.A.1 (indicating that hate is passed on through generations and that
juveniles are common hate crime offenders); infra Part II.A.2 (explaining that the victim is
more likely to suffer increased psychological harm and the community is more likely to
fear victimization after hate crime).
18
See infra Part II.A.3 (providing the text of current bills in the House of Representatives
as well as the three forms of hate crime legislation: penalty enhancement statutes, new
crime laws, and civil rights statutes).
19
Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-275, § (b)(1), 104 Stat. 140 (1990).
An offense committed in Salem, Oregon provides an example of a hate crime. Lori A.
Spillane, Hate Crime: Violent Intolerance, PROSECUTOR, 1995, at 20, 22. Three members of a
group known as the “American Front” targeted, fire-bombed, and killed Hattie Cohens, an
African-American lesbian, and her roommate, Brian Mock, a gay white man. Id. IND. CODE
§ 10-13-3-1 (2005) defines a bias crime as:
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act’s discriminatory motivation and the inherent violence in such an
attack.20 Humans more easily accept others that possess similar, if not
the same, characteristics as themselves.21 As a result, firmly rooted
elements of human society—hatred and prejudices—have been passed
from generation to generation, and tension, distrust, and hatred exist
among individuals against groups that possess different traits.22 Hate
crime occurs when these biases are expressed through violent action.23
[A]n offense in which the person who commits the offense knowingly
or intentionally: (1) selected the person who was injured; or (2)
damaged or otherwise affected property; by the offense because of the
color, creed, disability, national origin, race, religion, or sexual
orientation of the injured person or of the owner or occupant of the
affected property or because the injured person or owner or occupant
of the affected property was associated with any other recognizable
group or affiliation.
Id.; see In re Christopher M., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61, 68 (Ct. App. 2005) (convicting a juvenile of
a hate crime after the minor taped his friends robbing a Hispanic man at gunpoint,
thereafter admitting that the crime was motivated by hate). For the purpose of this Note,
the term “hate crime” is broad and is synonymous with bias-motivated crime, ethnic
intimidation, malicious harassment, and malicious intimidation. See also Steven Bennett
Weisburd & Brian Levin, “On the Basis of Sex”: Recognizing Gender-Based Bias Crimes, 5 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 21 (1994) (arguing that gender should not be included, but in a separate
category of bias crimes); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HATE CRIME DATA COLLECTION GUIDELINES
1, 2 (Oct. 1999), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/hatecrime.pdf [hereinafter HATE
CRIME DATA] which defines a hate crime as a bias crime. A “bias crime” is further defined
as one that is “[a] criminal offense committed against a person or property which is
motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender’s bias against a race, religion, disability,
sexual orientation, or ethnicity/national origin; also known as Hate Crime.” HATE CRIME
DATA, supra, at 2.
20
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 20-1, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1994) (No.
92-515). The brief explains that the defendant’s attack on the victim was wrong because of
the violence; however, the act was also punishable because of the defendant’s
discriminatory motive. Id.; see infra note 75 and accompanying text (further describing the
case of Wisconsin v. Mitchell where the Court upheld Wisconsin’s hate crime penalty
enhancement statute).
21
Craig L. Uhrich, Comment, Hate Crime Legislation: A Policy Analysis, 36 HOUS. L. REV.
1467, 1497 (1999).
22
Robert J. Boeckmann & Carolyn Turpin-Petrosino, Understanding the Harm of Hate
Crime, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 207 (2002); Uhrich, supra note 21, at 1497. However, more exposure
to the hated characteristic may help eliminate negative attitudes toward that trait. Id.
Familiarity breeds acceptance and reduces hate. Id.; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
42.014(b) (2006) (requiring a hate crime offender to attend educational classes to develop
tolerance and acceptance of others who possess different characteristics).
23
HATE CRIME DATA, supra note 19, at 7-8. There is an important distinction between a
hate crime and an ordinary crime. Id. at 4. To be a hate crime, the offense must have been
motivated by a particular characteristic, but the simple fact that a victim possessed a
particular characteristic is insufficient to categorize the crime as hate crime. Id. Evidence
such as bias-related drawings, comments at the scene of the crime, or different
characteristics between the victim and offender, are objective indicia of a hate crime. Id. at
5. One example is if a group of Caucasian individuals assaulted a black individual while
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Among minors, who are arrested for a minimum of at least half of bias
related offenses, 24 hate crime commonly occurs when young individuals
transform radical beliefs into violent acts.25 Organized groups also
commit hate crimes, but the frequency of hate crimes within organized
groups as compared to individual offenses is uncertain.26 But regardless
of the identity of the offender, throughout the past century this nation
has experienced a vast number of heinous and widely publicized hate
crimes that have had a severe impact on not only the victims, but society
as well.27

the individual passed through a predominately white residential neighborhood and
witnesses stated that the individual was attacked because of his race. Id. at 8. Conversely,
a lack of objective factors precludes the following situation from being categorized as a hate
crime. Id. at 7. For example, a white juvenile took a purse from a Jewish woman, pushed
her over, and made a derogatory statement against Jews. Id. However, little was known
about the offender’s beliefs and if his motivation was purely to steal the purse or was
motivated because the victim was Jewish. Id.; see James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter,
Hate Crimes: A Critical Perspective, 22 CRIME & JUST. 1, 20-29 (1997) (providing a definition
and examples of other bias motivated crimes such as anti-black, anti-ethnic, and antifemale).
24
Spillane, supra note 19, at 22. More specifically, there is evidence indicating that
young males commit more hate crimes than young females. Cynthia R. Clausen,
Addressing Juvenile Hate Crimes in Kentucky, 8 KY. CHILD. RTS. J. 19 (2000); Kristine Olson,
The Government and the Community: A Coordinated Response to Hate Crime in America, 45 FED.
LAW. 47 (1998); see Annie Steinberg et al., Youth Hate Crimes: Identification, Prevention, and
Intervention, 160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 979, 979 (2003) (noting that youth and juveniles
constitute an overwhelming number of hate crime offenders). However, Steinberg admits
that evidence is limited due to “the lack of definitive data collection” on juvenile hate crime
offenders. Steinberg, supra, at 980. The absence of data is attributable to the states that do
not include the ages of hate crime offenders in data reports. Id. Evidence on adult hate
crime offenders indicates that an individual with a criminal history is more likely to
commit more severe hate crime. Id. at 984. Perpetrators of violent hate crime likely have a
difficulty with substance abuse and are “economically marginalized.” Id. However, there
is a lack of definitive data to conclude that an adult hate crime offender is from a particular
socioeconomic status, faith, or ethnicity. Id. But see Megan Sullaway, Psychological
Perspectives on Hate Crime Laws, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 250, 277 (2004) (referencing
data from the Los Angeles Police Department that ran contrary to the notion that juveniles
are the most common offenders of hate crimes).
25
Steinberg, supra note 24, at 989. Such acts of violence from extremist ideas may be
motivated by thrill and retaliation. Sullaway, supra note 24, at 277.
26
Spillane, supra note 19, at 20. Organized groups committed to prejudice include the
Ku Klux Klan, the Order, White Aryan Resistance, and groups of skinheads. Jacobs &
Potter, supra note 23, at 29. These groups “recruit white males, women and children who
have not realized their American dream.” Clausen, supra note 24, at 19.
27
See James W. Clarke, Without Fear or Shame: Lynching, Capital Punishment and the
Subculture of Violence in the American South, 28 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 267, 270 (1998) (explaining
the brutal murder of Henry Lowry who was set on fire while still breathing); Kristen M.
Jasket, Note, Racists, Skinheads and Gay-Bashers Beware: Congress Joins the Battle Against Hate
Crime by Proposing the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 509, 511
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The Effect of Hate Crime on Victims and Society

Hate crime has effects on both victims and society that are absent in
other violent crime.28 First, the commission of hate crime has serious
consequences for victims.29 Specifically, hate crime offenders target
(describing the grotesque murder of James Byrd, Jr. who was beaten, chained, and dragged
to death, and had his arms and head detached from his body solely because of his race);
Uhrich, supra note 21, at 1468 (discussing the October 7, 1998 death of Matthew Shepard,
who was beaten by two men in Laramie, Wyoming, after finding out that Matthew was
gay).
28
Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase Your
Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L. REV.
333, 340 (1991); see Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, supra note 22, at 209 (noting empirical
research that demonstrates the “impact of hate crime victimization exceeds that of ordinary
crime victimization”). A hate crime victim is more likely to be beaten, tortured, and
hospitalized than a victim of a general, unbiased violent crime. Heidi M. Hurd & Michael
S. Moore, Punishing Hatred and Prejudice, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1085 (2004); Weisburd &
Levin, supra note 19, at 23. However, Hurd and Moore urge that the argument that hate
crime results in greater physical injury is flawed. Hurd & Moore, supra, at 1085. The
authors fail to see a justification for an enhanced punishment based on an increased injury
because it uses the “defendant’s hate/bias motivation as a proxy for a victim’s greater
harm—and not as an indication of the defendant’s culpability.” Id. at 1086. Hate crimes
stigmatize victims who subsequently manifest a belief in the stereotype and experience
deterioration in self worth. Id.; see Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, supra note 22, at 218
(noting that penalty enhancement laws are necessary because “of the unique harms
assumed to be created by crimes motivated by hate”). Increased psychological harm
includes decreased self-esteem, lowered sense of security, and decreased trust. Hurd &
Moore, supra, at 1087; Scott D. McCoy, The Homosexual-Advance Defense and Hate Crime
Statutes: Their Interaction and Conflict, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 629, 650-52 (2001). Again
opponents reject this argument because all violent crimes cause the victim to suffer
psychological trauma. Hurd & Moore, supra, at 1087. Further empirical studies attempt to
demonstrate a greater psychological harm from hate crime but the studies do not directly
compare the trauma of victims of a hate motivated assault to the trauma of assault victims.
Id. at 1088.
29
State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558, 563 (Or. 1992). The court referenced the legislative
history of the Oregon hate crime statute and stated that in enacting the statute:
[T]he legislature determined that the potential for harm is greater
when . . . causing physical injury to a victim because of the perception
that the victim belongs to one of the specified groups creates a harm to
society distinct from and greater than the harm caused by the assault
alone. Such crimes—because they are directed not only toward the
victim but, in essence, toward an entire group of which the victim is
perceived to be a member—invite imitation, retaliation, and insecurity
on the part of persons in the group to which the victim was perceived
by the assailants to belong. Such crimes are particularly harmful,
because the victim is attacked on the basis of characteristics, perceived
to be possessed by the victim, that have historically been targeted for
wrongs. Those are harms that the legislature is entitled to proscribe
and penalize by criminal laws.
Id. at 563-64; see Uhrich, supra note 21, at 1507 (discussing the psychological effects of hate
crime on victims); infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the enactment of penalty enhancing statutes
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victims because of a particular sexual preference, religious belief, or an
immutable characteristic beyond the victims’ control, such as skin
color.30 As a result, victims may experience a decreased sense of self
worth or identity.31 Further, victims receive the message that their
presence in a community is unacceptable, and in response, often
suppress their beliefs.32 Ultimately, hate crime isolates its victims from
society because friends and acquaintances may refuse to associate with
the victims for fear of their own safety.33
In addition to its significant effects on victims, hate crime imposes
even greater effects on the community.34
Hate crime promotes
retaliation by groups that possess the targeted characteristic, thus
making revenge a goal of the targeted group.35 Hate crime also

because of the effect that hate crime has on victims and society to warrant an increased
penalty when the crime is motivated by hate for a particular characteristic).
30
Gellman, supra note 28, at 340; McCoy, supra note 28, at 652; Weisburd & Levin, supra
note 19, at 24; see In re Joshua H., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291, 299-300 (Ct. App. 1994) (emphasizing
the effects that targeting an immutable characteristic has on the victim).
31
Gellman, supra note 28, at 340; Weisburd & Levin, supra note 19, at 23; see Michael S.
Degan, Comment, “Adding the First Amendment to the Fire”: Cross Burning and Hate Crime
Laws, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1109, 1113 (1993) (discussing the psychological effects, such as
“high blood pressure, sleep disorders, post-traumatic stress disorders, [and] hypertension”
that hate crime has on victims).
32
Degan, supra note 31, at 1113. Hate crime offenders threaten a victim’s sense of safety
because the victims targeted characteristic is likely permanent. Uhrich, supra note 21, at
1506. A threatened sense of safety has caused some victims to take action such as moving
to another community so that they are not as noticeable. Sullaway, supra note 24, at 264; see
Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, supra note 22, at 209. Examples of messages sent to
victims by offenders include “I don’t like you gays” and “[y]ou Jews will no longer control
the United States government; we will root you out and destroy you.” Id. Additionally,
hate crimes often make victims suppress their beliefs. Hurd & Moore, supra note 28, at
1087; McCoy, supra note 28, at 650-52
33
Uhrich, supra note 21, at 1507 (indicating that the purpose of hate crime legislation is
to “send the message that the victim, and those similarly situated, are valued by society
and that society will defend victims of violent crimes”).
34
Gellman, supra note 28, at 340; McCoy, supra note 28, at 652.
35
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 20, at 24-25. Scholars have divided hate crime
offenders into categories based on their motive, such as thrill and reactive, and have sought
to expand the typology to include retaliation. Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, supra note
22, at 216. Specifically, hate crimes motivated by retaliation “stem from a primary concern
with reciprocating or paying back for a prior hate crime incident. This category is
particularly relevant to identifying and prosecuting hate crime criminals from areas in
which intergroup relations are strained and tensions are high.” Id. As to revenge as a goal,
see State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558, 564 (Or. 1992); Jack McDevitt, Jack Levin & Susan
Bennett, Hate Crime Offenders: An Expanded Typology, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 303 (2002); supra note
29 and accompanying text (discussing Plowman and why hate crimes are worse than crimes
without a bias motivation).
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interferes with the stability and safety of the community.36 In particular,
a community may fear victimization after an offender discovers the
community’s sympathetic attitude towards victims.37
Furthermore, the surrounding community suffers increased
psychological trauma similar to that suffered by victims.38
The
community experiences feelings such as sympathy, empathy, insecurity,
isolation, and depression.39 Penalty enhancements are retributive and
address this harm because they convey society’s disapproval of hate
crime.40 Federal and state legislatures have recognized these effects of
hate crime on victims and society and have enacted and strengthened
hate crime legislation in response.41
3.

Hate Crime Legislation

Within the past twenty years, federal and state legislatures have
recognized the need to punish and deter hate crime offenders.42
36
Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2005, H.R. 259, 109th Cong. (2005). Hate crime
produces two types of victims, direct and indirect. Gellman, supra note 28, at 342. The
latter victims may, but do not necessarily, possess the targeted characteristic. Id. For
instance, an attack on a Catholic instills a fear of future attacks in other Catholics as well as
other races and religions within the community. Id. Ultimately, “bigotry-related crime
affects society as a whole, by distancing non-bigoted majority group members from
disempowered groups.” Id.
37
Gellman, supra note 28, at 342; Jasket, supra note 27, at 540-41. For instance, an assault
on a minority instills fear in other minorities despite the message that the offender
intended to convey. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 20, at 25. Consequently,
minorities consciously avoid vulnerable situations such as refraining from moving into a
neighborhood dominated by a majority. Id.
38
Hurd & Moore, supra note 28, at 1090.
39
Id. Hurd and Moore question the legitimacy of this argument for enhanced sentences
based on the effects that hate crimes have on the community. Id. at 1091. The primary
objection is whether or not the community suffers more harm from a hate crime than a
crime motivated without a bias. Id.; see supra note 36 (providing the behavioral changes
that hate crimes cause members of the community).
40
Eric J. Grannis, Note, Fighting Words and Fighting Freestyle: The Constitutionality of
Penalty Enhancement for Bias Crimes, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 178, 222 (1993).
41
Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2005, H.R. 259, 109th Cong. (2005); Gellman, supra note
28, at 340; McCoy, supra note 28, at 655. Congressional findings indicate that existing
federal laws are inadequate to address the problems caused by hate crime. Hate Crimes
Prevention Act of 2005, H.R. 259, § 2; see infra note 49 and accompanying text (presenting
current federal bills introduced in the House and Senate that seek to ensure prosecution of
hate crimes and provide federal assistance to local governments enforcement of hate crime
laws); infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (providing different hate crime state
statutes).
42
See Spillane, supra note 19, at 21 (noting that prior to 1980, five states enacted a statute
punishing hate crime and by 1995 more than a majority of states had legislation punishing
the heinous acts).
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Specifically, Congress responded to this need by enacting the Hate
Crime Statistics Act in 1990.43 This Act requires the Attorney General to
obtain data and create guidelines regarding crime that resulted from
intolerance for a particular religion or characteristic.44 The Act also
provides some punishment for committing a hate crime.45
Congress also enacted the Hate Crime Prevention Act, which
criminalized hate crime and originated from 1969 congressional civil
rights legislation.46 The statute provides a one year sentence for any
offender who intimidates or injures another based on a specific
characteristic or religion while the victim seeks employment, enjoys a
benefit, or enrolls in a public institution.47 The government must
demonstrate that the crime was committed while the victim was engaged
in a federally protected activity.48 Currently, four bills before the House
Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-275, § (b)(1), 104 Stat. 140 (1990).
Id. The requirement of collecting data took place from 1990-1994. Id. However, the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 was the Act that broadened the
characteristics to include disability. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). The Act was codified as amended in
numerous titles of the United States Code. Id. Throughout the years that the FBI gathered
and reported statistics, the number of hate crime increased, although the data collected
included reports from a greater number of police departments. Id. Statistics from “almost
2,800 police departments in 32 states” in 1991 indicated that 4,558 hate crimes were
committed that year. ADL.org, Hate Crimes Laws, http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/
federal.asp (last visited Jan. 31, 2007) [hereinafter ALD.org]. In 1992, the FBI reported 7,442
hate crimes from 6,181 agencies and from “42 states and the District of Columbia.” Id.
Data from 1994 indicated there were 7,587 hate crimes from 7,356 police departments. Id.
There were 7,947 hate crimes reported in 1995 from 9,584 agencies in the United States. Id.
Finally, in 1996 the FBI reported 8,759 hate crimes from 11,355 law enforcement agencies
throughout the nation. Id. Two years later, the number of hate crimes reported decreased
to 7,755. UFBI, http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel99/ucr98.htm (last visited Jan. 31,
2007). Before the turn of the century, 12,122 agencies reported 7,876 hate crimes. Id.
Throughout 2000, agencies reported 8,152 hate crimes. Id. In 2001, data reported by 11,987
law enforcement agencies indicated that 9,276 hate crimes were committed. Id. Data from
2002 indicated that 1,868 out of 12,073 agencies reported 7,462 hate crime incident reports.
Id. However in 2003, 1,967 out of 11,909 agencies reported 7,489 hate crimes. Id. States
such as Hawaii have similar statutes that require the gathering and reporting of hate crime
data on national origin, gender identity or expression in addition to those required in the
federal reporting guidelines that expanded to include disability. See HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 846-51 to 54 (2004) (hate crime reporting).
45
See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text; infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text
(providing federal hate crime legislation).
46
Federally Protected Activities, 18 U.S.C § 245 (2000); Jasket, supra note 27, at 519.
47
18 U.S.C. § 245.
48
Id.; ADL.org, supra note 44. The statute defines a federally protected activity as
(A) enrolling in or attending any public school or public college; (B)
participating in or enjoying any benefit, service, privilege, program,
facility or activity provided or administered by any State or
43
44
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of Representatives and Senate propose amendments to existing federal
hate crime legislation.49 But in addition to federal hate crime legislation,
subdivision thereof; (C) applying for or enjoying employment, or any
perquisite thereof, by any private employer or any agency of any State
or subdivision thereof, or joining or using the services or advantages of
any labor organization, hiring hall, or employment agency; (D)
serving, or attending upon any court of any State in connection with
possible service, as a grand or petit juror, (E) traveling in or using any
facility of interstate commerce, or using any vehicle, terminal, or
facility of any common carrier by motor, rail, water, or air; (F) enjoying
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which
provides lodging to transient guests, or of any restaurant, cafeteria,
lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility which serves
the public and which is principally engaged in selling food or
beverages for consumption on the premises, or of any gasoline station,
or of any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena,
stadium, or any other place of exhibition or entertainment which
serves the public, or of any other establishment which serves the
public and (i) which is located within the premises of any of the
aforesaid establishments or within the premises of which is physically
located any of the aforesaid establishments, and (ii) which holds itself
out as serving patrons of such establishments.
18 U.S.C. § 245. See United States v. Johns, 615 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1980) (chapter of the Ku
Klux Klan was convicted for intimidating and interfering with members of the NAACP’s
efforts to secure better employment by firing shots at the homes and cars of NAACP
members); United States v. Griffin, 525 F.2d 710, 712 (1st Cir. 1975) (the defendant was
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 245(b) for purposely interfering with black children’s right to
attend school without knowing the extent of that right); United States v. Price, 464 F.2d
1217 (8th Cir. 1972) (demonstrating a federally protected activity). But see United States v.
DeLaurentis, 491 F.2d 208, 209 (2d Cir. 1974) (where one defendant was charged with a
violation of § 245(b) for interfering with members of a labor unions’ right not to participate
in a concerted labor activity; however, the charge was dismissed because the jury
disagreed).
49
Thomas.loc.gov, Thomas Legislative Information on the Internet, http://thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/query/bdquery (last visited Jan. 31, 2007). First, the House proposed the Hate
Crimes Prevention Act of 2005 “[t]o enhance Federal enforcement of hate crimes.” Hate
Crimes Prevention Act of 2005, H.R. 259, 109th Cong. (2005). This bill provides an
amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 245 to imprison, fine, or both imprison and fine anyone who
willfully injures another with a firearm because of the victim’s “actual or perceived race,
color, religion, or national origin.” Id. The bill further provides the same punishment for
anyone who injures another based on the victim’s perceived “religion, gender, sexual
orientation, or disability.” Id. One stipulation is that the circumstances must include the
offender or victim’s participation in foreign or interstate commerce, otherwise the offender
may not be prosecuted under the proposed amendment to the statute. Id. Also, it
proposed a bill to provide federal assistance to state and local governments to further the
enforcement of hate crime laws. Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of
2005, H.R. 2662, 109th Cong. (2005). The bill proposes to provide state and local
governments with additional personnel for the enforcement of hate crime laws. Id. § 6.
The bill further seeks to offer “technical, forensic, prosecutorial, or any other form of
assistance in the criminal investigation or prosecution” of hate crime. Id. § 4(a)(1).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 4 [2007], Art. 8

1696 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

states have responded by enacting statutes that punish hate crime
offenders.50 State legislation has generally regulated either hate speech
or hate crime.51 Since speech-based hate statutes punish an individual
for offensive statements directed at another because of a particular
characteristic or religion, they have been struck down by the Supreme
Court because they are inconsistent with freedom of speech.52 In R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota,53 the Supreme Court found that Minnesota’s
speech-based hate statute violated the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution and declared it unconstitutional.54 Specifically,
Proposed in the House, the Hate Crime Statistics Improvement Act of 2005, H.R. 1193,
109th Cong. (2005), broadens the necessary reporting characteristic-based crimes to include
gender. Currently, the Hate Crime Statistics Act only includes race, religion, sexual
orientation, and ethnicity. Id. Finally, the Senate introduced the Local Law Enforcement
Enhancement Act of 2005, S. 1145, 109th Cong. (2005), which expands the duties of the
federal sentencing commission. The bill includes amendments similar to the House bill
and the Hate Crime Statistics Improvement Act of 2005, H.R. 1193. Id. However, the
Senate bill added to the sentencing commission’s current duty of enhancing the penalty for
an adult who recruits a juvenile to commit a crime. Id. The amendment requires the
Commission to investigate (without providing the exact method) the frequency of adults
who recruit juveniles to commit hate crime. Id. § 8. Further, the bill obligates the
Commission to enhance the penalty for an adult who enlisted a juvenile to commit a hate
crime. Id.
50
See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (providing a further description of state
hate crime legislation).
51
Anthony S. Winer, Hate Crimes, Homosexuals, and the Constitution, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 387, 419 (1994); see Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2338 (1989) (discussing hate speech and the effect of
hate speech on the victim).
52
Winer, supra note 51, at 419; see Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, supra note 22, at 209
(defining hate speech as “speech that (1) has a message of racial inferiority, (2) is directed
against a member of a historically oppressed group, and (3) is persecutory, hateful, and
degrading”); infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (striking a hate based speech statute).
53
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
54
Id. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the petitioner, a juvenile, along with a couple of
teenagers, assembled a cross out of broken chair legs and burned it in the yard of a
neighboring black family. Id. at 380. The individuals were charged under St. Paul’s BiasMotivated Crime Ordinance, which provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a
burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly
conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id. The petitioner brought a challenge against the statute alleging that the statute was
overbroad and violated the First Amendment because it was content based and facially
invalid. Id. The Court held the statute unconstitutional because it was overbroad and
regulated areas of protected speech. Id. at 391. The Court reasoned that the ordinance
“prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech
addresses.” Id. at 381. The ordinance was content based and was not within any First
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speech-based hate statutes invariably conflict with the First Amendment
because the statutes regulate protected speech.55 In contrast, hate crime
statutes are more likely to withstand constitutional challenges because
the statutes regulate conduct instead of speech.56
In fact, almost every state has a hate crime statute that either
provides a criminal penalty or a penalty enhancement for the
commission of a hate crime.57 The breadth of hate crime statutes vary
among states, but most state statutes generally fit into one of three
different categories.58 First, some statutes may provide a sentence
Amendment exception that allowed regulation of speech. Id. at 394. The ordinance was
not a justifiable content-based fighting words statute because the ordinance prohibited
words “that communicate messages of racial, gender, or religious intolerance” instead of
an “intolerable . . . mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey.” Id. at
393. Further, the ordinance was not aimed at the secondary effects, which justify contentbased regulation of speech. Id. at 394. Finally, the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling governmental interest of protecting members of a group that
historically faced discrimination because there was a less restrictive alternative. Id. at 395.
55
Winer, supra note 51, at 419. Alternatively, the statute would likely be upheld if it
regulated obscenity, defamation, or commercial speech, areas of speech unprotected or less
protected under the First Amendment. Id.
56
See State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 (Or. 1992). In Plowman, Plowman and three others,
beat one individual and punched another who fell to the ground at a store in Portland. Id.
at 560. After being informed that the store clerk called the police, Plowman shouted
“‘[t]hey’re just Mexicans’ and ‘[t]hey’re just . . . wetbacks.’” Id. Subsequently, Plowman
and the other offenders were charged with first degree assault and assault in the fourth
degree under Oregon’s hate crime statute. Id. The statute was challenged under two
sections of the Oregon Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Id.
The Oregon statute provided a criminal punishment when two or more persons acted in
concert to “[i]ntentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause physical injury to another
because of their perception of that person’s race, color, religion, national origin or sexual
orientation.” Id.; OR. REV. STAT. § 166.165(1)(a)(A) (2003). Plowman argued that the phrase
involving race, religion, national origin or sexual orientation was “void for vagueness.”
Plowman, 838 U.S. at 562. The Court upheld the statute because the language was clear and
it indicated what conduct was prohibited. Id. The Court further noted that the statute
“proscribes and punishes committing an act, not holding a belief” or punishes speech
because one can commit an assault without speaking. Id. at 563; see also Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (stating that “violence or other types of potentially
expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative
impact . . . are entitled to no constitutional protection”); Winer, supra note 51, at 419.
57
See infra note 61 (providing the states that have a penalty enhancement statute); infra
note 62 (indicating which states define hate crime as a new crime); infra note 63 (presenting
the states that have a civil rights statute). The states that do not have a statute that
penalizes hate crimes are Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
and South Carolina.
58
Winer, supra note 51, at 419. Race, religion and ethnicity are included in most state
statutes. Shirley S. Abrahamson et al., Words and Sentences: Penalty Enhancement for Hate
Crimes, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 515, 522 (1994); ADL.org, supra note 44. However,
less consistency exists among states regarding the inclusion of gender, sexual orientation,
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enhancement for a crime motivated by a bias.59 Many of these statutes
resemble the Anti-Defamation League’s model penalty enhancement
statute for bias-motivated crime, which increases the sentence for an
already defined crime.60 A second type of statutes define hate crime as a
age, and or disability in the corresponding hate crime statute. ADL.org, supra note 44.
However, under any hate crime statute, the prosecution has the difficult burden to prove a
bias motivation. Spillane, supra note 19, at 24-25. Elements such as common sense, the
suspect’s language, including racial slurs, “[s]everity of the attack (particular types of
mutilation), [l]ack of provocation, [c]ontact or prior history between the victim and suspect,
[p]revious history of similar incidents in the same area, [and] [a]bsence of any other
apparent motive (e.g., battery without robbery)” aid the prosecution in fulfilling its burden.
Id. at 24.
59
See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-13(a)(3)(b) (2005) (crimes motivated by victim’s race, color,
religion, national origin, ethnicity, or physical or mental disability); ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.155(C)(22) (2005) (factors in aggravation and mitigation); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13702(C)(15) (LexisNexis 2005) (sentencing; definition); CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.75 (West 2005)
(enhanced penalties for hate crime); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-40a (2005) (persistent offenders
of crimes involving bigotry or bias); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(v) (2005)
(classification of offenses; sentences); FLA. STAT. § 775.085 (2005) (evidencing prejudice
while committing offense; reclassification); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-17 (2005), invalidated by
Botts v. State, 604 S.E.2d 512 (Ga. 2004) (enhanced sentence where defendant intentionally
selected victim or property as object of offense because of bias or prejudice); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-4716 (2004), invalidated by State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2001) (mitigating and
aggravating factors); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-306 (West 2005) (penalty); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 99-19-305 (2005) (enhanced penalty sentencing procedure); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-5-222 (2005) (sentence enhancement); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-111 (2005) (enhanced
penalty); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.185 (2004) (additional penalty); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6
(2005) (extended term of imprisonment); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18B-3 (West 2005) (hate
crimes); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.10 (McKinney 2005) (sentencing); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-3
(2005) (felonies and misdemeanors); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (West 2005) (ethnic
intimidation); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-38 (2004) (hate crimes sentencing act); TENN. CODE.
ANN. § 40-35-114(22) (2005) (enhancement factors); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.014
(Vernon 2005) (requiring attendance in an educational program to further tolerance and
acceptance of others); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.3 (2005) (penalty for hate crime); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1455 (2005) (hate-motivated crimes); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57 (2005)
(assault and battery); WIS. STAT. § 939.645 (2005) (penalty).
60
ADL.org, supra note 44. The ADL’s penalty enhancement model statute for bias
motivated crimes provides:
A person commits a Bias-Motivated Crime if, by reason of the actual or
perceived race, color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation or
gender of another individual or group of individuals, he violates
Section ____ of the Penal Code (insert code provisions for criminal
trespass, criminal mischief, harassment, menacing, intimidation,
assault, battery and or other appropriate statutorily proscribed
criminal conduct).
A Bias-Motivated Crime under this code provision is a ____
misdemeanor/felony (the degree of criminal liability should be at least
one degree more serious than that imposed for commission of the
underlying offense).
Hate Crimes Laws, http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/text_legis.asp (last visited Jan. 31,
2007). But see Gellman, supra note 28, at 355-58 (providing the evolution of the ADL model
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new crime.61 These statutes are independent and specifically prohibit
crime motivated by a person’s bias.62 A third type of hate crime statutes
are civil rights statutes that provide a penalty for the interference of a
victim’s enjoyment of constitutionally protected rights.63 Civil rights
statute and argues that the statute is vague for numerous reasons including a lack of a
culpable mental state).
61
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.55 (West 2005) (hate crime defined); COLO. REV. STAT. § 189-121 (2005) (bias-motivated crimes); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-181j (2005) (intimidation
based on bigotry or bias in the first degree); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7902 (2005) (malicious
harassment defined); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.1 (2005) (hate crime); IND. CODE. ANN.
§ 10-13-3-1 (West 2005) (bias crime defined); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.031 (West 2005)
(findings on hate crime); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107:2 (2005) (hate crimes); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 10-301 (West 2005) (hate crimes); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 39 (2005) (assault
or battery for purposes of intimidation); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.147b (2005) (ethnic
intimidation); MINN. STAT. § 609.2231(4) (2005) (assault in the fourth degree); MO. REV.
STAT. § 557.035 (2005) (crimes motivated by race, color, religion, national origin, sex, sexual
orientation or disability of the victim); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-221 (2005) (malicious
intimidation or harassment relating to civil or human rights); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-401.14
(2005) (ethnic intimidation); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-14-04 (2005) (official oppression;
elections; civil rights); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 850 (2005) (malicious intimidation or
harassment because of race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin or disability); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 166.155, 165 (West 2003) (intimidation in the second degree); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 22-19B-1 (2005) (actions constituting harassment); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.080
(2005) (malicious harassment); see also Winer, supra note 51, at 424 (providing new crime
statutes).
62
Spillane, supra note 19, at 20 (noting that this category of hate crime legislation
conflicts the most with the First Amendment because the prosecution includes issues
related to protected speech). For instance, Connecticut’s statute defines intimidation based
on bigotry or bias as:
(a) A person is guilty of intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the
first degree when such person maliciously, and with specific intent to
intimidate or harass another person because of the actual or perceived
race, religion, ethnicity or sexual orientation of such other person,
causes serious physical injury to such other person or to a third person.
(b) Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the first degree is a class C
felony.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-181j (2005). In Connecticut, a Class C felony is punishable for up to
ten years. Id. § 53a-35. Other crimes punishable as a Class C felony punishable for up to
ten years include bribery of a juror and bribery received by a juror. Id. § 53a-181j.
Specifically, for illustration purposes, Connecticut punishes a person for bribing a juror if
that person “offers, confers or agrees to confer upon a juror any benefit as consideration for
the juror’s decision or vote.” Id. § 53a-152. Therefore, bribery and hate crime are both
punishable for up to ten years in Connecticut. Id.
63
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West 2005) (interference with exercise of civil rights
because actual or perceived characteristics of victim); IOWA CODE § 729.5 (2005) (violation of
individual rights); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4003 (2004) (crimes involving personal rights); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2931 (2005) (interference with constitutional and civil rights is
prohibited); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 37 (2005) (violations of constitutional rights); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.147b (civil action for ethnic intimidation); TENN. CODE ANN. § 3917-309 (2005) (exercise of civil rights and intimidation); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.3 (2005)
(penalty for hate crime, civil rights violation); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-6-21 (West 2005)
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statutes protect the right to engage in certain activities instead of
punishing offenders because the motivation for the crime was based on a
particular characteristic.64 Among penalty enhancement statutes, new
crime laws, and civil rights statutes, penalty enhancement statutes are
the only statutes that increase hate crime offenders’ punishment solely
because hate crime is more severe than ordinary violent crime.65
B. Penalty Enhancement
Some states recognize the inherent severity of hate crime, like
Hannah’s and James’s, and provide an increased sentence beyond that of
the underlying crime if a jury determines beyond a reasonable doubt that
the crime was committed because of a bias motivation.66

(prohibiting violations of an individual’s civil rights); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-9-102 (2005)
(discrimination prohibited; penalties); Winer, supra note 51, at 387. Some civil rights
statutes provide a civil cause of action regardless of the outcome of the criminal trial. Mich.
Comp. Laws § 750.147b (2005). Specifically, Michigan allows recovery in the amount of
$2,000 or three times the amount of damages, whichever is greater. Id.
64
For example, Tennessee’s statute provides, “. . . it is the right of every person
regardless of race, color, ancestry, religion or national origin, to be secure and protected
from fear, intimidation, harassment and bodily injury caused by the activities of groups
and individuals.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-309 (2005). Section (b) defines the offense of
intimidating others from exercising civil rights if one:
(1) Injures or threatens to injure or coerces another person with the
intent to unlawfully intimidate another from the free exercise or
enjoyment of any right or privilege secured by the constitution or laws
of the state of Tennessee; (2) Injures or threatens to injure or coerces
another person with the intent to unlawfully intimidate another
because that other exercised any right or privilege secured by the
constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution or laws of
the state of Tennessee; (3) Damages, destroys or defaces any real or
personal property of another person with the intent to unlawfully
intimidate another from the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege secured by the constitution or laws of the state of Tennessee;
or (4) Damages, destroys or defaces any real or personal property of
another person with the intent to unlawfully intimidate another
because that other exercised any right or privilege secured by the
constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution or laws of
the state of Tennessee.
Id. Further the statute indicates that a violation of this section is a class D felony. Id.
Tennessee law provides that a class D felony is punishable for not less than two and no
more than twelve years in prison. Id. § 40-35-111. Many of the state civil rights statutes
that contain such a penalty resemble the language of the Federal Hate Crimes Prevention
Act.
65
Spillane, supra note 19, at 20.
66
See supra note 59 and accompanying text (identifying the states that provide an
enhanced penalty for a hate crime).
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Application of an Enhanced Penalty Statute

If a state has adopted a penalty enhancement statute for hate crime,
offenders will be subject to an increased punishment.67 The purpose of
an enhanced penalty is not to punish the act, or the offender’s intention,
but the hatred that motivated the offender to create and act on the
intention.68 As a result, to implement the increased punishment for hate
crime, the prosecution must not only prove the elements of the
underlying offense, such as battery,69 but must also prove a bias or
motivation of hate.70 For example, a sentence enhancement may
67
Id.; see Dobbins v. State, 605 So. 2d 922, 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). The court stated
that indicators such as the relationship between the offender and victim, as well as the
conversation during the offense, demonstrate the selection of a victim based on a particular
characteristic and will support an increased sentence. Id. However, if a fight arose over a
dispute for a woman or money, derogatory comments regarding race or religion would be
insufficient to support an enhanced penalty. Id. Notably, mistake is not a possible escape
to an enhanced penalty. HATE CRIME DATA, supra note 19, at 6. Specifically, if an offender
mischaracterizes the victim’s sexuality, race, religion or the like, the misperception does not
affect classifying the crime as a hate crime. Id. Illustrative of this point is a situation where
a heterosexual patronized a gay bar and was attacked by teenagers under the
misperception that the heterosexual was gay. Id. However, the teenagers will still be
subject to the relevant hate crime or penalty enhancement statutes because the offense was
motivated by an anti-gay sentiment. Id.
68
Hurd & Moore, supra note 28, at 1128-29.
69
Gregory R. Nearpass, Comment, The Overlooked Constitutional Objection and Practical
Concerns to Penalty-Enhancement Provisions of Hate Crime Legislation, 66 ALB. L. REV. 547, 56364 (2003); see Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990);
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (providing an example of the application of a
sentence enhancement for other purposes, including recidivists); see also ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-4-501 (West 2005) (habitual offender statute); Baxter v. State, 922 S.W.2d 682 (Ark. 1996)
(the habitual offender statute provides a sentence enhancement following conviction if one
was previously convicted of a felony).
70
Nearpass, supra note 69, at 563-64. Also applicable to determining a bias for a
conviction under an ordinary hate crime law, the Hate Crime Data provides a list that is
not exhaustive, of fourteen possible pieces of objective evidence to indicate if a crime was
motivated by bias. HATE CRIME DATA, supra note 19, at 4. The evidence includes:
1. The offender and the victim were of different race, religion,
disability, sexual orientation, and/or ethnicity/national origin. For
example, the victim was black and the offender was white. 2. Biasrelated oral comments, written statements, or gestures were made by
the offender which indicate his/her bias. For example, the offender
shouted a racial epithet at the victim. 3. Bias-related drawings,
markings, symbols, or graffiti were left at the crime scene. For
example, a swastika was painted on the door of a synagogue. 8. A
substantial portion of the community where the crime occurred
perceived that the incident was motivated by bias. 10. The incident
coincided with a holiday or a date of particular significance relating to
a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity/national
origin, e.g., Martin Luther King Day, Rosh Hashanah.
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upgrade the classification of an offense from a second degree offense to a
first degree offense or a Class C felony to a Class B felony.71
Alternatively, some states increase the duration of a sentence by one to
three years.72 The failure of judicial challenges to enhanced penalty hate
crime statutes demonstrate the courts’ general acceptance of increased
punishments for hate crime offenders.73
2.

Constitutional Challenges to Penalty Enhancement Statutes

Hate crime penalty enhancement statutes have been challenged on
numerous constitutional grounds.74 First the statutes do not violate the
First Amendment; the Supreme Court has ruled that such laws are
content neutral and do not regulate protected speech.75 Equal Protection
Id. at 5.
71
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (1994).
72
Two main provisions of California’s penalty enhancement for hate crime state:
(a) Except in the case of a person punished under Section 422.7, a
person who commits a felony that is a hate crime or attempts to
commit a felony that is a hate crime, shall receive an additional term of
one, two, or three years in the state prison, at the court’s discretion. (b)
Except in the case of a person punished under Section 422.7, or
subdivision (a) * * * of this section, any person who commits a felony
that is a hate crime, or attempts to commit a felony that is a hate crime,
and who voluntarily acted in concert with another person, either
personally or by aiding and abetting another person, shall receive an
additional two, three, or four years in the state prison, at the court’s
discretion.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.75 (West Supp. 2005); see supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text
(describing the different forms of hate crime legislation and providing the corresponding
state statutes, including penalty enhancement statutes).
73
McCoy, supra note 28, at 654; see Lu-in Wang, The Transforming Power of “Hate”: Social
Cognition Theory and the Harms of Bias-Related Crime, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 80 (1997); Terry A.
Maroney, Note, The Struggle Against Hate Crime: Movement at a Crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
564, 568 (1998) (arguing that the surge of legislation, police activity, judicial reaction, and
scholarly interest, reflects society’s disapproval of hate crime).
74
See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (providing cases that involve challenges
based on the First Amendment, Equal Protection, Due Process, vagueness, and
overbreadth).
75
Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 484; Grannis, supra note 40, at 213. Penalty enhancement statutes
are content neutral because the statutes are viewpoint and subject-matter neutral. ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1058 (Aspen Pub. 2005). For example, the statutes do
not prohibit anti-abortion demonstrations and permit pro-abortion demonstrations. Id. If
the statutes regulated speech, the regulation would be permissible only if the statute
regulated areas of unprotected and less protected speech, such as obscenity, fighting
words, incitement of illegal activity, and commercial speech. Id. at 1150. Specifically, in
Mitchell, the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to Wisconsin’s penalty
enhancement provision. 508 U.S. at 484. Mitchell argued that the statute violated the First
Amendment because it punished “offenders’ bigoted beliefs” through enhancing the
penalty because of a discriminatory motive. Id. at 485 However, the Court upheld the
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challenges are unsuccessful because penalty enhancement statutes do
not seek to protect a certain class.76 Alternatively, the statutes do not
violate procedural due process if the jury makes the determination
beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was motivated because of a
bias—a legitimate reason for enhancing an offender’s penalty.77
Enhanced penalty statutes may also be challenged as unconstitutionally
vague, such as where they fail to define subject activity, are
unconstitutionally broad, or where they encompass constitutionally
protected activities.78 Unsuccessful challenges to enhanced penalty
statute against the challenge because the Constitution does not preclude the sentencing
judge from considering motives or beliefs in determining a punishment. Id. at 486; see
George L. Blum, Annotation, Validity, Construction and Effect of “Hate Crimes” Statutes,
“Ethnic Intimidation” Statutes, or the Like, 22 A.L.R. 5TH § 61, at 261 (2005) (providing
additional cases involving challenges to penalty enhancement statutes based on the First
Amendment).
76
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 5 (8th ed. 2004). Further, discriminatory
legislation must survive rational basis scrutiny unless the statute discriminates against a
protected class which subjects the law to a higher level of scrutiny, intermediate or strict.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 618; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 577. In State v.
Ladue, the defendant argued that the respective state’s hate motivated crime penalty
enhancement statutes provided special protection for certain classes of victims based on
race, sex, or national origin. 631 A.2d. 236, 237 (Vt. 1993). However, the court disagreed
and stated that the statute does not treat similarly situated victims differently. Id. Instead
the statute provides the same protection as if they were targeted because of a certain
characteristic. Id. In State v. Mortimer, the court accepted the government’s legitimate
interest in increasing the punishment for hate motivated crimes to “prevent the conduct
from occurring at all.” 641 A.2d 257, 267 (N.J. 1994). Therefore, the statute was upheld
against the Equal Protection challenge. Id.; see Blum, supra note 75, § 5 (discussing
challenges to penalty enhancement statutes based on Equal Protection).
77
See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 472 (2000). In Apprendi, the trial judge
applied the enhanced penalty statute to Apprendi’s punishment after the determination by
a preponderance of the evidence that the crime was motivated by a racial bias. Id. at 470.
Subsequently, Apprendi challenged New Jersey’s hate crime penalty enhancement statute
and argued that it violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Id. Notably, the
challenge was not based on the substance of the statute, but the procedures required to
determine an enhanced penalty. Id. at 472. The statute allowed the judge to determine bias
motivation and subject a defendant to an enhanced penalty. Id. The Supreme Court relied
on the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and the “jury trial guarantees of the
Sixth Amendment” to determine that “any fact . . . that increases the maximum penalty for
a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. at 476. Subsequently, the Court’s decision required that a jury, not a
judge, determine bias beyond a reasonable doubt to subject a defendant to an enhanced
penalty for a hate motivated crime. Id. Therefore, New Jersey’s hate crime enhancement
procedure was “an unacceptable departure from the jury tradition that is an indispensable
part of our criminal justice system.” Id. at 497; see also Blum, supra note 75, § 3 (discussing
challenges to penalty enhancement statutes based on Due Process).
78
A vague law precludes a reasonable person from determining what speech is
permitted and what speech is prohibited. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 1085.
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statutes demonstrate the constitutionality of penalty enhancements hate
crime statutes and the desire to deter both juveniles and adults from
committing hate crimes through an increased punishment.79
C. Juvenile Delinquency
The severity of Hannah’s and James’s hate crimes determines which
criminal justice system, the juvenile or adult, will process the case.80 Part
II.C.1 provides a definition of juvenile delinquency.81 Part II.C.2
examines the jurisdiction of the juvenile system.82 Finally, Part II.C.3
presents various theories that explain the causes of juvenile delinquency,
which is necessary in examining possible parental liability.83
1.

Defining “Juvenile Delinquent”

A “juvenile delinquent” is a minor who displays antisocial behavior
for which an adult who engaged in the same misconduct would be
subject to a criminal penalty. 84 The likelihood that juveniles will engage
Alternatively, an overbroad law regulates substantially more speech than the Constitution
permits. Id. at 1087; see Richards v. State, 643 So. 2d 89, 90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(upholding the penalty enhancement statute against a vagueness challenge because “the
statute clearly contains as one of its essential elements that the defendant was biasmotivated in committing the crime charged in that he or she intentionally selected the
crime victim because of the victim’s race, color, ethnicity, religion, or national origin”);
Dobbins v. State, 605 So. 2d 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting a vagueness and
overbreadth challenge to the penalty enhancement statute because the statute did require
that the racial slurs be related to the commission of a crime); Botts v. State, 604 S.E.2d 512,
538 (Ga. 2004) (striking Georgia’s hate crime penalty enhancement statute because the
statute failed to provide offenders with notice of the prohibited conduct); see also Blum,
supra note 75, at § 4 (discussing challenges to penalty enhancement statutes based on
vagueness and overbreadth).
79
See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (explaining the constitutional challenges
to penalty enhancement statutes).
80
See infra note 104 (indicating that juveniles will likely be punished in the adult system
for more serious crimes such as murder).
81
See infra Part II.C.1 (defining juvenile delinquency and explaining the origins of
juveniles’ hatred).
82
See infra Part II.C.2 (examining the goals of the juvenile system in addition to
jurisdiction of the juvenile system).
83
See infra Part II.C.3 (providing theories such as the biological, anomie, cultural
deviance, and control).
84
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 884 (8th ed. 2004). Although reports indicated that the 1999
rate of 16.2% of arrests for violent crime for individuals under eighteen was low, Congress
argued that the rates were still too high. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 42
U.S.C. § 5601 (2000). Additional reports indicate that juvenile crime rates are expected to
double by 2010, which will result in a dramatic increase. Tammy Thurman, Parental
Responsibility Laws/Are They the Answer to Juvenile Delinquency? 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 99, 100
(2003); see James C. Backstrom & Gary L. Walker, The Prosecutor in Juvenile Justice: Advocacy
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in delinquency increases as parental supervision decreases.85 Research
indicates that a dysfunctional family and truancy also contribute to
juvenile delinquency, but economic resources are not determinative of
the presence or absence of juvenile delinquency.86 Those factors, inter
alia, help explain why minors participate in deviant behavior, including
hate crime, of which juveniles are common offenders.87
Juvenile hate crime is usually a consequence of violence and
prejudice.88 Juveniles may possess a prejudice against anyone who is of
a different race, has a dissimilar religious belief, or a different sexual
preference.89 These prejudices are commonly learned and accepted by
juveniles from their parents.90 Also, juveniles will likely adopt the same
prejudice and develop a similar hatred when the juveniles’ peers support
in the Courtroom and Leadership in the Community, PROSECUTOR, May-June 2004, at 37 (noting
that juvenile crime statistics include juveniles from all backgrounds and the prediction that
in 2010 juveniles will compose 22% of the population).
85
Howard Davidson, No Consequences—Re-examining Parental Responsibility Laws, 7
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 24 (1995). Specifically, delinquents influence minors who are,
overall, “good kids.” Id. Delinquency results from inadequate supervision in a household
with two working parents. Id.
86
Backstrom & Walker, supra note 84, at 44; Earl F. Martin & Marsha Kline Pruett, The
Juvenile Sex Offender and the Juvenile Justice System, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 279, 296-97 (1998);
Davidson, supra note 85, at 24. Statistics from Miami indicate that an overwhelming 71% of
juveniles charged with a criminal offense had been truant from school. Janet Stroman,
Holding Parents Liable for their Children’s Truancy, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 47, 48
(2000). Many factors cause juvenile misconduct, however a lack of parental supervision
contributes to juvenile delinquency and each factor has a different solution. Davidson,
supra note 85, at 29. Other factors that have been linked to juvenile delinquency include
“poverty, disorganized communities, media violence, [and] drugs.” Jerry E. Tyler et al.,
Parental Liability Laws: Rationale, Theory, and Effectiveness, 37 SOC. SCI. J. 1, 14 (2000).
87
Jacobs & Potter, supra note 23, at 21; see supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text
(discussing common hate crime offenders); see also Andrew M. Gilbert & Eric D. Marchand,
Splitting the Atom or Splitting the Hairs—The Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999, 30 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 931, 974 (noting that juvenile involvement in the commission of hate crime is
increasing); FBI.gov, Crime in the United States 2002, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_02/
html/web/arrested/04-table41.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2007) (providing arrest statistics
on a variety of crimes committed by persons under 15, 18, 21, and 25 years old).
88
Steinberg, supra note 24, at 983. Statistics from 1995-2000 on juvenile hate crime
indicates that juveniles committed 969 or 16.5% of hate crimes committed within five years.
An Analysis of NIBRS Hate Crime (1995-2000), http://www.as.wvu.edu/~jnolan/incao.htm
(last visited Jan. 31, 2007). Further, this was the highest percentage among four age groups:
under 18, 18-24, 25-39, and over 40. Id.
89
Steinberg, supra note 24, at 983. Steinberg argues that juvenile hate crime offenders
carry out “prejudicial beliefs and emotions concerning people who are perceived as
different.” Id.
90
Prejudice, the most commonly racial prejudice, is learned from an older generation.
Uhrich, supra note 21, at 1497. Children likely adopt the same prejudices as their parents.
Id.; see supra note 22 and accompanying text (which provides that prejudices are firmly
rooted in society and passed down through generations).
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a particular bias.91 Finally, adults with a bias motivation may recruit
juveniles to perform illegal conduct such as hate crime.92 Regardless of
the source, just like adults, if juveniles commit a crime because of a bias,
they can be convicted of a hate crime or subject to increased penalty for
an already defined crime.93 Whether the adult or juvenile criminal
justice system will prosecute juvenile hate crime offenders depends on
the severity of the hate crime itself.94
2.

Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Justice System

In response to the increase in juvenile delinquency, federal and state
legislatures have reacted in different ways.95 Congress has sought to
expand jurisdiction over juvenile delinquents and prosecute juveniles as
adults in federal court.96 State legislatures have increased the duration of
91
Steinberg, supra note 24, at 983. The prejudice is held among a group of juveniles and
not just one juvenile. Id. Particularly, a prejudice held by a group becomes “widely shared
and enduring element of the culture in which it occurs.” Id. Prejudices held among a
group “pose a particular threat to young people, who are the most impressionable
members of society. Violence and prejudice have become unavoidable in schools; rather
than a refuge from hate attacks, schools have become fertile ground for violent bigotry.”
Id.
92
Uhrich, supra note 21, at 1473. The Senate recognized this recent phenomena and
proposed a bill that provided that the Federal Sentencing Commission shall “amend the
Federal sentencing guidelines to provide sentencing enhancements . . . for adult defendants
who recruit juveniles to assist in the commission of hate crimes.” Local Law Enforcement
Enhancement Act of 2005, supra note 49, § 8.
93
See In re Vladimir P., 670 N.E.2d 839, 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (convicting a juvenile for
aggravated assault and a hate crime because evidence indicated beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant threw a knife at a boy by reason of the victim’s religion); ADL.org, supra
note 44 (discussing a Texas verdict that convicted a juvenile of a hate crime because the
juvenile and three others burned a cross on the victim’s lawn, hung a noose on a tree, and
spray painted a racial epithet on the victim’s driveway).
94
Spillane, supra note 19, at 4; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260B.101 (2005); Backstrom &
Walker, supra note 84, at 40 (presenting the factors that warrant the transfer of a juvenile to
adult court which include “the seriousness of the crime, the threat to public safety, the age
of the juvenile, the juvenile’s criminal history and other relevant factors”).
95
Davidson, supra note 85, at 23; see Juvenile Justice System Structure and Process,
http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/structure_process/case.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2007)
[hereinafter Juvenile Justice System] (diagramming how a delinquency case is processed
within the juvenile system).
96
Laura K. Langley, Giving Up On Youth: The Danger of Recent Attempts to Federalize
Juvenile Crime, 25 J. JUV. L. 1 (2005). The original notion against prosecuting juveniles was
reversed in the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2000). The Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act requires a showing by the Attorney General of one of three
factors to prosecute a juvenile in federal court that:
(1) the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a State does not
have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over said juvenile
with respect to such alleged act of juvenile delinquency, (2) the State
does not have available programs and services adequate for the needs
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penalties and decreased the age at which juveniles may be transferred to
an adult court.97
The decision to transfer a juvenile to the adult system also
determines with whom the juvenile will serve a sentence. Separate
courts and facilities to incarcerate juvenile delinquents and adult
criminals have existed for over a century.98 The first juvenile court was
established in Illinois pursuant to the state’s Juvenile Court Act of 1899.99
One original goal of the separate facilities was to prevent subjection of
juveniles to the abuses and risks within the adult system.100
Subsequently, juveniles were also granted the same basic due process
rights that adults are afforded in the criminal system.101 If a juvenile is
of juveniles, or (3) the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a
felony or an offense described in section 401 of the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841), or section 1002(a), 1003, 1005, 1009, or
1010(b)(1), (2), or (3) of the Controlled Substances Import and Export
Act (21 U.S.C. 952(a), 953, 955, 959, 960(b)(1), (2), (3)), or section 924(b),
(g), or (h) or (x) of this title, and that there is a substantial Federal
interest in the case or the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal
jurisdiction.
Id.; Langley, supra at 3; see United States v. Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2002);
United States v. David H., 29 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Rombom, 421 F.
Supp. 2d 1295 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (involving decisions of which system to prosecute a
juvenile).
97
Langley, supra note 96, at 1.
98
The juvenile court created the issue of which system to punish juveniles who commit
crimes. Kimberly Burke, Notes & Comments, All Grown Up: Juveniles Incarcerated in Adult
Facilities, 25 J. JUV. L. 69 (2005).
99
Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899, § 1, Ill. Laws 131 (repealed 1965). Initially the first
juvenile court focused on civil matters rather than criminal law. Tyler et al., supra note 86,
at 3. Consequently, the emphasis was protection rather than punishing the child for their
misconduct. Id. Subsequently, all but three states established a juvenile court by 1917,
which sought to further the focus on civil protection instead of criminal punishment. Id.;
see FLA. STAT. § 985.201 (2005). The statute provides the jurisdiction of a circuit court in the
proceeding of a delinquency case and additional conditions such as age that would require
the court to relinquish control over the child. Id. § 985.201.
100
Burke, supra note 98, at 70. Most importantly, the juvenile system prevents nonviolent
juveniles from being housed in the same facility as violent adult criminals because the lack
of separation is “self-destructive and self-defeating.” Id. at 69; see FLA. STAT. § 985.215. The
statute explicitly provides that juveniles should not be placed in the same cell as adults and
any contact should only result from an accident. Burke, supra note 98, at 70. A rationale for
separation and risk of integration is that the rate of juvenile suicide is eight times higher
among those housed in adult facilities than juvenile centers. Id. at 72. Another risk of
integration is a greater possibility of juveniles being harassed or abused by adult inmates.
Id.
101
Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 3; see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The decision in Gault
ensures that juveniles are afforded Constitutional rights when prosecuted in the juvenile
system. Gault, 387 U.S. at 13. Specifically, the court stated that “neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.” Id. Therefore, since 1967, among
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convicted in an adult court, the juvenile must serve a sentence in an
adult prison.102 As a result, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act of 1974 created standards to encourage consistency
among states when placing juveniles in adult prisons.103 Finally, an
underlying purpose of the juvenile system is rehabilitation and to
convert juveniles into law abiding citizens through clinical processes.104
Accordingly, the juvenile system has implemented solutions tailored to

other rights, juveniles are afforded the right to counsel, the right to cross examine and
confront witnesses, and the privilege against self incrimination. Tyler et al., supra note 86,
at 3.
102
See Juvenile Justice System, supra note 95 (noting that the prosecutor makes the
ultimate decision to prosecute the juvenile within the criminal or juvenile system). See
generally Monya A. Bunch, Note, Juvenile Transfer Proceedings: A Place for Restorative Justice
Values, 47 HOW. L.J. 909, 910 (2004). For the more serious crimes, the answer is obvious;
however, many cases are not so clear cut. Burke, supra note 98, at 69. Following a
conviction in an adult court, juveniles are then automatically transferred to adult prisons.
Id. at 71. For example, a female juvenile was indicted by a grand jury for numerous
robberies and then transferred to an adult detention facility pending trial. State ex rel.
Powers v. Schwartz, 355 So. 2d 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). The petitioner argued that the
judge had a non-discretionary duty to keep her in the Youth Hall because the adult facility
subjected her to cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 461. However, the court disagreed
and held that the judge had a duty to keep the indicted juvenile ineligible for bail or
pretrial release in the adult facility. Id.; see also State Dep’t of Children & Families v.
Morrison, 727 So. 2d 404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (dealing with the transfer of a juvenile to
adult court); Postell v. State, 383 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). But see FLA. STAT.
§ 985.233 (2005). The statute provides the criteria to determine when to impose juvenile
sanctions instead of adult sanctions. Id. Specifically, the court considers factors such as the
effect of the crime on the community, the maturity of the juvenile, and the offender’s
criminal history. Id.
103
42 U.S.C. § 5633 (2000); Burke, supra note 98, at 70. The statute provides that juveniles
should not be placed in an adult facility unless the juvenile is accused of a nonstatus
offense and the detention should not exceed six hours for the purpose of “processing or
release; while awaiting transfer to a juvenile facility; or in which period such juveniles
make a court appearance.” 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(13) (2000). Other guidelines include the
prohibition of detaining juveniles in an adult facility who are aliens, dependents, or who
violated a court order. Id. § 5633(a)(11); see FLA. STAT. § 985.215 (providing Florida’s
guidelines for the detention of a juvenile following the commission of a crime).
104
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16 (noting that “[t]he child was to be ‘treated’ and
‘rehabilitated’ and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to
be ‘clinical’ rather than punitive”). Further, the juvenile system includes educational
programs designed to encourage juveniles to become productive members of society
following release. Burke, supra note 98, at 72. However, juveniles who commit serious
crimes such as murder, may be incapable of rehabilitation and would not benefit from
educational programs inherent in the juvenile system. Id. at 74. Therefore, courts detain
the juveniles in adult facilities. Id. For example, a juvenile was sixteen when he was
convicted of voluntary manslaughter and conspiracy and was sentenced to two to four
years in an adult facility. Commonwealth v. Lucas, 622 A.2d 325, 326 (Pa. 1993). Burke
argues that the combination of age and commission of a heinous crime may indicate that
the juvenile system’s programs would not be effective. Burke, supra note 98, at 74.
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respective offenses to address and correct the causes of juvenile
delinquency. 105
3.

Theories of Juvenile Delinquency

Scholars have developed various theories regarding causes of
juvenile delinquency.106 These theories evolved from disciplines such as
biology, psychology, sociology, and anthropology.107 First, biological
theorists have reasoned that there is a connection between biological
processes and delinquency.108 These theorists recommend medicine and
rehabilitation as resolutions to juvenile delinquency.109 Conversely, the
anomie theory stresses that juveniles’ simultaneous desires and
inabilities to conform to the majority result in delinquency.110 The
underlying presumption of the anomie theory is that juveniles will
perform any act necessary to obtain the status of the dominant culture.111
Alternatively, the cultural deviance theory explains that the juvenile is
part of a subculture accepting of deviant behavior.112 A major
presumption of this theory is that parental influence is an important
factor in determining whether juveniles will engage in delinquency.113

105
Burke, supra note 98, at 72; Langley, supra note 96, at 3; see Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas
Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 143 (1998) (noting that separate facilities existed for
juveniles and adults because juveniles are more vulnerable and therefore different
correctional responses needed to be administered). But see Bunch, supra note 103, at 910
(suggesting that the goals of the juvenile system have changed and are now more similar to
the adult system because of a focus on punishment); Scott & Grisso, supra, at 137 (arguing
that the juvenile system’s initial goal of rehabilitation is diminishing and the next step is to
abolish the juvenile justice system because its current goals are the same as the adult
system).
106
Linda A. Chapin, Out of Control? The Uses and Abuses of Parental Liability Laws to
Control Juvenile Delinquency in the United States, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 621, 665 (1997).
107
Id.
108
Id. The biological theory proposes that there is a causal connection between biological
abnormalities and delinquent behavior. Thurman, supra note 84, at 102. Further, the
biological theory parallels past criminology studies that sought to predict criminal behavior
based on an individual’s physiology. Id.
109
Chapin, supra note 106, at 665.
110
Id. at 666.
111
Thurman, supra note 84, at 102. Juveniles resort to illegitimate means to obtain
desired results. Chapin, supra note 114, at 666. For example, a juvenile who cannot
purchase a car will steal a car to obtain the success enjoyed by the majority. Id.
112
Chapin, supra note 106, at 667.
113
Juveniles learn deviant behavior through association with a particular subculture. Id.
Additionally, “[u]nder some circumstances hate crimes may be viewed as mischievous
juvenile acts committed by youngsters seeking a thrill or peer approval.” Boeckmann &
Turpin-Petrosino, supra note 22, at 208; Clausen, supra note 24, at 19.
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Another theory, the control theory, proposes that there is a
correlation between the strength of juveniles’ bonds with society and the
probability of engaging in delinquency.114 This theory states that
juvenile delinquency is a result of juveniles’ weak bonds to conventional
society.115 First, this theory emphasizes minors’ close attachment, or lack
thereof, to parents, teachers, and peers.116 Effective communication and
spending time with others help to develop these attachments that impact
whether or not juveniles will engage in delinquency.117 The second
element, commitment, proposes that juveniles committed to convention
are more likely to obey the law.118 Conversely, juveniles less committed
to convention engage in deviant behavior because they have little to lose
from antisocial activity.119 The involvement element indicates that
normal activities, such as attending school or possessing a hobby, reduce
the time available for delinquency.120 Similarly, studies indicate that
juveniles with high academic involvement and achievement in reading,
writing, and arithmetic were less likely to participate in delinquency
than juveniles that were less successful in school.121 The last element
relates to juveniles’ beliefs in the rules of the deviant subculture and

114
Chapin, supra note 106, at 667-68. A major presumption of this theory is that parental
influence is an important factor to determine whether juveniles will engage in delinquency.
Id. at 669. Therefore, the greater the attachment between parents and juveniles, the less
likely that juveniles will become delinquent. Id. See generally Bruce Watt et al., Juvenile
Recidivism: Criminal Propensity, Social Control and Social Learning Theories, 11 PSYCHIATRY
PSYCHOL. & L. 141 (2004) (providing information on the control theory).
115
Chapin, supra note 106, at 667-68; see Robert Richard Lyerly & James K. Skipper, Jr.,
Differential Rates of Rural-Urban Delinquency: A Social Control Approach, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 385
(1981) (attempting to explain through the social control theory the differing rates of
juvenile delinquency between urban and rural areas).
116
Chapin, supra note 106, at 668. Based on the attachment element, a child is supposed
to learn “socially acceptable behavior” from their parents. Michael D. Wiatrowski et al.,
Social Control Theory and Delinquency, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 525 (1981).
117
Watt et al., supra note 114, at 145.
118
Chapin, supra note 106, at 668. This element, commitment, has been said to be related
to the aspiration of pursuing higher education and if pursued, the juvenile will not likely
engage in delinquent behavior. Wiatrowski et al., supra note 116, at 525.
119
Watt et al., supra note 114, at 145.
120
Chapin, supra note 106, at 668. Thus, the prediction is that socially active juveniles are
less likely to engage in delinquency. Watt et al., supra note 114, at 145; see Angela J.
Huebner & Sherry C. Betts, Exploring the Utility of Social Control Theory for Youth
Development: Issues of Attachment, Involvement, and Gender, 34 YOUTH & SOC’Y 123 (2002).
121
Watt et al., supra note 114, at 145; see Laurie A. Drapela, Does Dropping Out of High
School Cause Deviant Behavior: An Analysis of the National Education Longitudinal Study, 26
DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 47 (2005) (studying the impact that dropping out of school has on the
probability a juvenile will participate in delinquency).
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subsequent violation of those rules.122 Deviant subcultures possess
prejudices for a particular race, religion, gender, or ethnicity, and appeal
to juveniles because the group’s “ideals provide a kind of external
superego.”123 The control theory implies that parents’ actions may be a
contributing cause to juvenile delinquency, and that legislatures have
enacted parental liability laws to encourage parental supervision and
reduce juvenile delinquency.124
D. Parental Liability Laws
Parental liability provides Hannah’s and James’s
redress against their parents for the hate crimes they
juvenile delinquents.125 Part II.D.1 explores various
imposing liability on parents and Part II.D.2 discusses
challenges to parental liability statutes.126
1.

victims with
committed as
methods for
constitutional

Forms of Parental Liability Legislation

Primarily, parental liability statutes are a reaction to the increase in
juvenile delinquency.127 The imposition of liability on parents can be
122
Chapin, supra note 106, at 665; see supra note 26 and accompanying text (providing
deviant subcultures especially those that participate in hate crimes, such as the Ku Klux
Klan, the Order, and the White Aryan Resistance).
123
Steinberg et al., supra note 24, at 984.
124
Chapin, supra note 106, at 668. But see Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 6. Tyler points out
that the problem with the social control method is that the theory only addresses how to
reduce juvenile delinquency without providing a solution on how to handle its effects. Id.
The theory implies that a way to eliminate juvenile delinquency is to confine juveniles to a
schedule of school, then immediately lock them in their rooms, force them to attend church
on Sunday, go straight home, and start the process over. Id. Even in an ideal world this
routine is not desirable. Id. Conversely, a high amount of parental control may encourage
a child to rebel or be uncontrollable. Id. Tyler argues that this theory fails to provide an
explanation for juvenile delinquency and does not address the effects of such repressive
measures. Id. However, parental liability laws are one way to address the problem of
juvenile delinquency. See infra notes 197-224 and accompanying text (providing how
parental liability laws are consistent with the control theory).
125
Thurman, supra note 84, at 99. “The law has an important role to play in helping to
ensure that parents protect their children from violence and in holding parents accountable
when they have had the ability to control their children’s behavior, but failed to do so.”
Davidson, supra note 85, at 28.
126
See infra Part II.D.1 (imposing liability on parents through criminal sanctions or civil
liability based on theirs such as strict liability, misaction, inaction or negligence); infra Part
II.D.2 (providing challenges to parental liability laws based on the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses of the United States Constitution and respective state constitutions).
127
Chapin, supra note 106, at 631; Thurman, supra note 84, at 99. Other countries such as
Australia and England recognize the increased need to hold parents accountable for the
misconduct of juveniles and have reacted accordingly. Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 2.
Parental liability laws have been described as an impulsive reaction within state
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explained by legal theories such as strict liability, misaction, inaction, or
negligence.128 These legal theories provide the basis for the imposition of
a criminal penalty on parents for juvenile misconduct, an action for civil
damages, or both.129
A state may hold parents criminally responsible for the misconduct
of their children through a “contributing to the delinquency of a minor”
statute.130 The rationale behind such statutes is that the family is the

legislatures to juveniles increased involvement with weapons, gangs, and violence. Id. at 4.
Tyler questions if the laws actually reduce juvenile delinquency, and argues that the initial
response is in the affirmative. Id. at 9. Admittedly, punishing the parents instead of the
child causes one to wonder if parental liability “serves the community or the child.” Id.; see
Naomi R. Cahn, Pragmatic Questions About Parental Liability Statutes, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 399
(providing further explanation for the purpose of parental liability statutes).
128
Thurman, supra note 84, at 103. First, liability is imposed regardless of fault, similar to
strict liability. Commonly, parents receive sanctions under truancy or curfew statutes with
the purpose of encouraging parents’ cooperation with school and community officials to
eliminate the juvenile’s skipping school or staying out after a designated time. Id. Second,
misaction warrants the imposition of liability. Id. Misaction involves parents’ knowing or
willful actions that contribute to the delinquency of a minor. Id. Parental misaction
includes abuse, rejection, or teaching a juvenile how to commit a crime. Id. A final legal
theory is based on inaction or negligence. Id. The statutes impose liability on parents for
the failure to act and the most relevant statutes are improper supervision or neglect. Id.
Under this theory, liability is imposed when a parent “entrusted their child with a
dangerous instrument or if the parents were aware of their child’s vicious propensities.”
Eve M. Brank et al., Parental Responsibility Statutes: An Organization and Policy Implications, 7
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 3 (2005). This is the view reflected at common law. Id.
129
Thurman, supra note 84, at 99. One argument is that the imposition of a penalty to
hold parents accountable for juvenile delinquency is a “quick-fix” reaction to the increase
in juvenile delinquency because the laws are the only “known” way to control juvenile
delinquency. Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 8.
130
Eunice A. Eichelberger, Annotation, Criminal Responsibility of Parent for Act of Child, 12
A.L.R. 4TH 673 (1994); see Kathryn J. Parsley, Constitutional Limitations on State Power to Hold
Parents Criminally Liable for the Delinquent Acts of Their Children, 44 VAND. L. REV. 441 (1991)
(discussing challenges to criminal liability laws based on the vagueness doctrine and right
to privacy); ALA. CODE § 12-15-13 (2006) (causing, etc., of delinquency, dependency or need
of supervision of children); ARIZ REV. STAT. § 13-3613 (LexisNexis 2006) (contributing to
delinquency and dependency; classification; procedure); CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West
2007) (contributing to delinquency of persons under 18 years; persuading, luring, or
transporting minors 12 years of age or younger). Alternatively, parents can also be held
liable under an endangering the welfare of a child statute. Davidson, supra note 85, at 2324. Endangering the welfare of the child involves a situation where the parent knows that
a child is being abused and fails to protect the child. Id. Subsequently, laws allow for a
criminal punishment and recourse in a juvenile civil court in the form of a child protective
action. Id.; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.060 (West 2004). The Kentucky statute provides:
(1) A parent, guardian or other person legally charged with the care or
custody of a minor is guilty of endangering the welfare of a minor
when he fails or refuses to exercise reasonable diligence in the control
of such child to prevent him from becoming a neglected, dependent or
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primary influence in the lives of juveniles, and that the family is in the
best position to encourage youth to become constructive members of
society.131 In 1903, Colorado was the first state to enact a statute that
provided a penalty for contributing to the delinquency of a minor.132
Since then, all fifty states have enacted a similar statute providing a
felony or misdemeanor for parents of juvenile delinquents.133 Under
these laws, parents are penalized when a lack of supervision causes
juvenile delinquency.134 But in contrast to tort liability, under a

delinquent child. (2) Endangering the welfare of a minor is a Class A
misdemeanor.
Id. § 530.060.
131
Parsley, supra note 130, at 446. The role of the family is to demonstrate the importance
of obedience to authority. Id. Therefore, supporters argue that juvenile delinquency results
from an absence of parental control and guidance. Id.
132
Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993); Thurman, supra note 84, at 103. The
original Colorado law provided that contributing to the delinquency of minors was
punishable as a misdemeanor with a maximum one year imprisonment and/or a $1,000
fine. Brank et al., supra note 128, at 4. Now, the statute provides that contributing to the
delinquency of a minor is a class 4 felony which is punishable for two to four years in
prison and one year of parole. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-701 (2005); id. § 18-1.3-401.
133
James N. Kourie, Annotation, Mens Rea or Guilty Intent as Necessary Element of Offense
of Contributing to Delinquency or Dependency of Minor, 31 A.L.R. 3D 848 (2004); see Brank et
al., supra note 128, at 26 (providing a table with all the states that have a contributing to the
delinquency of a minor statute).
134
Some of the most common applications of the statutes include juveniles’ failure to
observe a city curfew, selling liquor, and illegal operation of a motor vehicle. See People v.
Walton, 161 P.2d 498 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945); People v. Ferello, 268 P. 915 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1928); Reeves v. State, 143 S.E. 462 (Ga. Ct. App. 1928). In Walton, the ordinances
imposed a criminal penalty on the parents of a juvenile under sixteen who allowed the
“minor to remain, stroll upon, use, loiter on or be upon any street or public place between
the hours of 9 p.m. and 4 a.m. of the following day, unless accompanied by an adult having
the care and custody of such minor, or unless the minor had in his possession a permit
issued by the sheriff showing the necessity of such minor to so use such street or public
place.” Walton, 161 P.2d at 500. Walton’s son was a sixteen-year-old who was out on the
street between the hours indicated in the ordinance. Id. at 499. Subsequently, Walton was
charged with a violation of the ordinance. Id. In Ferello, the mother was convicted of
contributing to the delinquency of her minor daughter for encouraging the daughter to sell
liquor. Ferello, 268 P. at 916. Similarly, in Reeves, the court upheld the mother’s indictment
for a misdemeanor that resulted from their thirteen-year-old’s illegal operation of a motor
vehicle. Reeves, 143 S.E. at 462. The father was not with the child, however, the mother was
a passenger in the car. Id. Therefore, the presumption was that the mother knew that her
child was not legally licensed to drive and that the mother aided and abetted in her son’s
commission of a crime. Id.; see also Ala. State Bar v. Quinn, 926 So. 2d 1018 (Ala. 2005)
(disbarring Quinn, an attorney, based on his conviction of a serious crime, to wit causing
delinquency by smoking marijuana with minors); State v. J.L. 945 So. 2d 884, 889 (La. Ct.
App. 2006) (upholding the defendants conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a
minor based on the performance of a sexually immoral act); State v. Ramirez, No. 13-04-30,
13-04-31, 2005 WL 696868 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005); State v. Rayfield, 631 S.E.2d 244 (S.C. 2006)
(defendant was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor).
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contributing statute, parents must possess the necessary mental state,
such as influencing, helping, or soliciting delinquents to be liable.135
Additionally, victims may institute a civil suit against a delinquent’s
parents.136 Common law, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and state
statutes, each address the issue of holding parents responsible for the
misconduct of juveniles.137 Historically, common law did not allow
victims to recover against juvenile offenders’ parents for juveniles’
intentional acts.138 However, exceptions to this rule have evolved.139
Parents may be held liable for their minors’ misconduct if the parents
either acted or failed to act.140 Absent participation, liability could be
imposed on parents based on master-servant or principle-agent
relationships between the parents and juveniles.141 But a suit could not
be brought against the juveniles in an individual capacity.142 Rather, in
Brank et al., supra note 128, at 10-11; Chapin, supra note 106, at 639; Kourie, supra note
133, § 4; see Ind. Code § 35-46-1-8(a) (2005) (providing that “[a] person at least eighteen (18)
years of age who knowingly or intentionally encourages, aids, induces, or causes a person
less than eighteen (18) years of age to commit an act of delinquency (as defined by IND.
CODE § 31-37-1 or § 31-37-2) commits contributing to delinquency, a Class A
misdemeanor”).
136
Davidson, supra note 85, at 26.
137
B. C. Ricketts, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statutes Making Parents Liable for
Torts Committed by Their Minor Children, 8 A.L.R. 3D 612 (2005).
138
Harris v. Traini, 759 N.E.2d 215, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). The foundation of common
law was the refusal to find liability without fault. Gilbert Geis & Arnold Binder, Sins of
Their Children: Parental Responsibility for Juvenile Delinquency, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 303, 309 (1991); see Bebry v. Zanauskas, 841 A.2d 282, 286 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004)
(reiterating that common law does not impose vicarious liability on the parents for the torts
of their minors); Jeffrey L. Skaare, Note, The Development and Current Status of Parental
Liability for the Torts of Minors, 76 N.D. L. REV. 89, 92 (2000) (discussing the historical roots of
the common law tradition); see also Chapin, supra note 106, at 629-30 (providing the
common law limitations on parental tort liability).
139
See supra note 138 and accompanying text (describing the common law exceptions).
140
More specifically, common law allowed recovery against parents “(1) where the
parent entrusts the child with an instrumentality which, because of the child’s lack of age,
judgment, or experience, may become a source of danger to others; (2) where the child
committing the tort is acting as the servant or agent of its parents; (3) where the parent
consents, directs, or sanctions the wrongdoing; and (4) where the parent fails to exercise
control over the minor child although the parent knows or with due care should know that
injury to another is possible.” Wells v. Hickman, 657 N.E.2d 172, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
Also, common law imposed liability due to the failure to act when the parents were aware
of the child’s dangerous propensities and failed to exercise reasonable control over the
children to prevent misconduct. Ricketts, supra note 137, § 1(a); see Chapin, supra note 106,
at 629-30.
141
South ex rel. South v. McCarter, 119 P.3d 1, 8 (Kan. 2005). Common law rejected the
imposition of liability based on the existence of a parent child relationship. Ricketts, supra
note 137, § 1(a).
142
Davidson, supra note 85, at 26.
135
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contrast to common law, but similar to the current trend in statutes, the
Restatement focuses on the parental duty to control juveniles.143
Parental liability statutes focus on encouraging parents to supervise
their juveniles and reduce juvenile delinquency.144 Many states impose
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (2005). The Restatement provides:
A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his
minor child as to prevent it from intentionally harming others or from
so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to
them, if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the
ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of the
necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.
Id. However, some parents are not able to control their children. Davidson, supra note 85,
at 29. The inability to control one’s minor is an ongoing debate which questions the value
of parental liability laws. Id.
144
The phenomena of enacting statutes to provide redress against parents for victims of
juvenile crime started in Hawaii in 1846. HAW. REV. STAT. § 577-3.5 (2004); Andrew C.
Gratz, Comment, Increasing the Price of Parenthood: When Should Parents Be Held Civilly Liable
for the Torts of Their Children?, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 169, 190 (2002). Over time, states adopted
similar statutes that added elements to Hawaii’s, such as Louisiana’s limitation on the
amount of damages recoverable from the parents. Gratz, supra, at 190. Next, Louisiana
enacted a vicarious liability statute that was in direct conflict with common law. Id. The
relevant Louisiana statute provides, “[t]he father and the mother and, after the decease of
either, the surviving parent, are responsible for the damage occasioned by their minor or
unemancipated children, residing with them, or placed by them under the care of other
persons, reserving to them recourse against those persons.” LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art.
2318 (2004). The statutory language appeared to impose strict liability on parents,
however, judgments entered against the parents indicated that an element of willful or
negligent conduct of the minor is required to obtain damages. Ricketts, supra note 137,
§ 5(a); see Ryle v. Potter, 413 So. 2d 649, 651 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (imposing strict liability on
parents of a minor who shot a B-B gun at a friend who sustained serious head injuries);
Polk v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 115 So. 2d 399 (La. Ct. App. 1958) (holding the minor’s
father liable for the negligent acts of his minor child, utilizing a dangerous instrumentality);
see also ALA. CODE § 6-5-380 (2005) (liability of parents for destruction of property by
minor); ALASKA STAT. § 34.50.020 (2005) (liability for destruction of property by minors);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Ann. § 12-661 (2005) (liabilities of parents or legal guardians for malicious
or willful misconduct of minors); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-25-102 (West 2005) (parental
liability); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.1 (West 2005) (liability of parents and guardians for willful
misconduct of minor); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-107 (2005) (damages for destruction or
bodily injury caused by minors); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572 (2005) (parental liability for
torts of minors); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 6105 (2005) (liability of parent, guardian or
employer for negligence of minor); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.24 (2005) (civil action against
parents); GA. CODE. ANN. § 51-2-3 (2005) (liability of parent or guardian for willful torts by
minor children); HAW. REV. STAT. § 577-3.5 (2004) (property damage, parental
responsibility); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-210 (2005) (recovery of damages for economic loss
willfully caused by minor); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/3 (2005) (parental responsibility law);
IND. CODE § 34-31-4-1 (2005) (limited liability of parents for damages caused by child);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.16 (West 2005) (parental responsibility for actions of children); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-120 (2004) (recovery from parents for malicious or willful acts by certain
children); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.180 (West 2005) (financial penalty when children
found delinquent); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 2318 (2004) (acts of minor); ME. REV. STAT.
143
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liability on the parents when juveniles act intentionally, willfully, or
maliciously.145 These statutes resemble a form of strict liability because
the parents are liable regardless of whether they acted reasonably.146 In
some situations, liability is imposed based on the parents’ knowledge of
misconduct.147 However, the scope of liability varies because some states
ANN. tit. 14, § 304 (2005) (liability of parents or legal guardians for damage by children);
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-28 (West 2005) (liability for acts of child); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231 § 85G (West 2005) (parents’ liability for willful acts of minor
children); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2913 (West 2005) (malicious or willful destruction
of property by minors); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 540.18 (West 2005) (damage by minor,
responsibility of parent, guardian, and minor); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 94-13-2 (West 2005)
(child’s property damage, parental liability); MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.045 (West 2005) (parent
or guardian liable for damages by minor); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-237 (2005) (destruction
of property by minor); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-801 (2005) (destruction of property); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 41.470 (2005) (imposition of liability for minor’s willful misconduct); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:53A-15 (West 2005) (liability of parent or guardian for willful destruction of
property by infant under eighteen); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-27 (West 2005) (injury to
person or destruction of property); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-112 (McKinney 2005) (liability
of parents and legal guardians having custody of an infant for certain damages caused by
such infant); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-538.1 (West 2005) (strict liability for damage to
person or property by minors); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39 (2003) (parental responsibility
for minor children); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.70 (West 2005) (parental liability for
minor child’s acts); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (West 2005) (recovery of damages by
political subdivisions from parents of children under age of eighteen); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 30.198 (West 2003) (parental liability); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5502 (West 2005)
(liability of parents); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-3 (2004) (liability of parents for torts of minors);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-8940 (2004) (civil liability for injury to state property); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 25-5-15 (2005) (parental liability for willful acts of child); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10101 (West 2005) (damages for personal injuries or destruction of property); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon 2005) (liability of parents for conduct of child); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-11-20 (West 2005) (liability of parent or legal guardian); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 901
(2004) (parents’ liability for damages); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-44 (West 2005) (action against
parent for damage to private property by minor); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.190 (West
2005) (action against parent for willful injury to person or property by minor); W. VA.
CODE. ANN. § 55-7A-2 (West 2005) (parental liability for willful, malicious or criminal acts
of children); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.035 (West 2005) (parental liability for acts of minor
child); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-203 (2005) (parental liability for property damage of certain
minors).
145
See generally 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/3 (2005) (providing that “[t]he parent or legal
guardian of an unemancipated minor who resides with such parent or legal guardian is
liable for actual damages for the willful or malicious acts of such minor . . . .”); Thompson
v. Park River Corp., 830 N.E.2d 1252, 1256 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). The Ohio Court of
Appeals refused to hold the parents liable for the acts of their minor child because there
was no indication that the child acted willfully and maliciously. Thompson, 830 N.E.2d at
1265.
146
Brank et al., supra note 128, at 3. Victims can recover against parents without proving
that the parents were at fault. Id. Further, the parents cannot “argue that they attempted to
supervise their child properly.” Id. at 3-4.
147
See Stewart v. Swartz, 106 N.E. 719 (Ind. Ct. App. 1914). The court held a parent liable
under the Indiana parental responsibility statute for the child’s intentional placement of a
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hold parents responsible for property damage, personal injuries, or
both.148 Other differences in the scope of liability include the amount of
damages recoverable from parents and the maximum age of juveniles for
which parents may be accountable.149 Statutes of different states provide
different minimum ages but almost all statutes do not extend liability
over age seventeen.150 Despite the variations of the statutes among the

rope across a street when the parent knew of the child’s actions. Id. at 720. In Shepard by
Shepard v. Porter, 679 N.E.2d 1383 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), the court refused to impose liability
under the parental responsibility statute because the parents were unaware of the son’s
propensity to start fires. Id. at 1389.
148
Gratz, supra note 144, at 190. Some statutes provide liability for personal injuries,
property damage, or both. Id.; see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.70 (West 2005) (providing
recovery for both property and personal injuries). But see MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-13-2 (2005)
(allowing recovery specifically for property damage without mentioning recovery for
personal injures suffered).
149
Gratz, supra note 144, at 191. Texas allows parents to be held liable up to $25,000. TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 41.002 (Vernon 2005); see also IND. CODE § 34-31-4-1 (2005) (providing
that the maximum amount of recovery is $5,000 for each separate incident against more
than one person); Parent and Child, IND. L. ENCYCL., 2005, § 37; Brank et al., supra note 128,
at 19 (indicating that the amount of damages recoverable under each state’s statute
imposing civil liability on parents); Chapin, supra note 106, at 632 (stating that the average
amount recoverable against parents is $2,500). Another variation among parental liability
statutes includes requiring parents to attend parenting classes or imposing a term of
imprisonment. Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 14.
150
See D.C. CODE § 16-2301(4) (2005) (defining a minor as an individual under age 21);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 304 (2005) (imposing liability on parents when the child is
between 7 and 17); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-237 (2005) (indicating that liability is impose
on parents for a person under the age of 18); TEX. FAM CODE. ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon 2005)
(providing the range for the imposition of liability on parents is 10-18); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-44 (West 2005) (which does not provide an age range, instead it imposes parental
liability for the acts of a minor). Ironically, South Dakota has a statute that imposes liability
and another statute that abrogates parental liability. See Miller v. Stevens, 256 N.W. 152,
154 (S.D. 1934) (holding that the sole existence of the parent child relationship does not
justify imposing liability on the parents for the misconduct of a minor). South Dakota’s
parental liability statute provides:
Any person, firm, association, private or public corporation, including
the State of South Dakota and its political subdivisions, suffering
damages to real, personal, or mixed property, or personal injury,
through the malicious and willful act or acts of a minor child or
children under the age of eighteen years while residing with their
parents, shall have therefor a cause of action against and recover of the
parents of such child or children. In each case the amount of recovery
against one or both of the parents shall be limited to actual damages of
fifteen hundred dollars and the taxable court costs, and does not apply
to damages proximately caused through the operation of a motor
vehicle by the minor child or children. If the issue is disputed, any
determination that a parent is not responsible for the full amount of
actual damages and costs authorized by this section shall be justified in
a specific finding, in writing or on the record.
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states, all of the statutes maintain a common goal—to reduce juvenile
delinquency.151 However, parental liability laws must first withstand
constitutional scrutiny before they can achieve the desired goal.152
2.

The Constitutionality of Parental Liability Statutes

Parental liability statutes are the legal reaction to reducing juvenile
delinquency, but such laws are not a viable solution unless the statutes
are upheld against challenges under the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution and under state
constitutions.153 In general, attempts to challenge the constitutionality of
parental liability statutes are unsuccessful.154 In Florida, the argument
that parental liability statutes violate substantive due process provisions
of the Constitution and respective state constitutions was rejected in
Stang v. Waller.155 In Stang, the court indicated that the statute met the
requirements inherent in substantive due process and was not
unreasonable or arbitrary, but rather was a reasonable means to achieve
a legitimate state goal.156 Specifically, the court further emphasized that
reducing juvenile delinquency through parental liability statutes was a
legitimate state interest.157
Parental liability statutes have also withstood Equal Protection
challenges.158 For example, a Nebraska statute was upheld because the

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-15 (2005). But see id. § 25-5-14. South Dakota’s statute
abrogating parental liability states that “[e]xcept as provided by § 25-5-15, neither parent
nor child is answerable as such, for the act of the other.” Id.
151
Chapin, supra note 106, at 631; Thurman, supra note 84, at 99.
152
See infra notes 153-61 and accompanying text (providing cases that involved
unsuccessful challenges to parental liability laws based on the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses of the United States Constitution and the constitution of the respective
state).
153
See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text (providing an unsuccessful challenge to
Florida’s parental liability statute based on the substantive due process clause of the United
States Constitution and Illinois constitution); infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text
(describing an unsuccessful challenge to Nebraska’s parental liability law based on the
Equal Protection clause of the United States Constitution and Nebraska constitution).
154
Vanthournout v. Burge, 387 N.E.2d 341, 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Skaare, supra note 138,
at 103.
155
415 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Skaare, supra note 138, at 105-06.
156
Stang, 415 So. 2d at 123-24; Skaare, supra note 138, at 105.
157
Stang, 415 So. 2d at 124; Skaare, supra note 138, at 105.
158
In Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, the plaintiff sought to recover damages
pursuant to the state’s parental liability statute from the defendants because their son set
fire to the plaintiff’s property. 443 N.W.2d 566, 569 (Neb. 1989). The plaintiff alleged that
the statute violated the Equal Protection clauses of both the Federal and Nebraska
Constitutions. Id.
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defendants failed to demonstrate that there was not a rational basis to
treat parents differently depending on whether juveniles caused
personal injury or property damage.159 The court stated that parental
liability statutes are rationally related to the goals of compensating
victims and eliminating juvenile delinquency.160 Subsequently, parental
liability laws like hate crime legislation and penalty enhancement
statutes will almost always withstand constitutional scrutiny; however
there is an inconsistency among the laws and a necessity to modify
existing parental liability laws.161
The history of hate crime legislation indicates that it may be
necessary to distinguish hate crime from other violent crime and subject
hate crime offenders to an increased penalty.162 Further, parental

Id. at 572. The argument was that the parental liability statute created a classification
because it limited the amount of personal damages recoverable against parents but not the
amount of property damages recoverable. Id. at 569-70. The Nebraska parental liability
statute provides that:
The parents shall be jointly and severally liable for the willful and
intentional infliction of personal injury to any person or destruction of
real and personal property occasioned by their minor or
unemancipated children residing with them, or placed by them under
the care of other persons; Provided, that in the event of personal injuries
willfully and intentionally inflicted by such child or children, damages
shall be recoverable only to the extent of hospital and medical
expenses incurred but not to exceed the sum of one thousand dollars
for each occurrence.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-801 (2005). However, there was not a fundamental right at issue, so
the statute was only subject to rational basis review. Cox, 443 N.W.2d at 570.
160
Cox, 443 N.W.2d at 570; Hayward v. Ramick 285 S.E.2d 697, 699 (Ga. 1982); Alber v.
Nolle, 645 P.2d 456 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); Buie v. Longspaugh, 598 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1980); Watson v. Gradzik, 373 A.2d 191 (Conn. C.P. 1977). In Distinctive, the
defendants also challenged the statute’s imposition of vicarious liability based on the due
process clauses of the Federal and State Constitution. Cox, 443 N.W.2d at 572. However,
the court rejected the challenge because imposing full or partial responsibility on the
parents is similarly a reasonable means to achieve a legitimate state interest. Id. In Bryan v.
Kitamura, 529 F. Supp. 394 (D. Haw. 1982), the court held that vicarious liability did not
infringe on a parent’s due process rights. Id. at 398-400. Notably, parents have a
fundamental right to control the upbringing of their children and do not commit a crime
for raising a juvenile to be a racist. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (establishing
that the right of parents to control the upbringing of their juvenile is a fundamental right);
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). However, subjecting parents to civil liability for juvenile
misconduct should encourage parents to appropriately exercise their fundamental right to
control the upbringing of their juvenile.
161
See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (including constitutional challenges to
penalty enhancement statutes).
162
See supra note 60 and accompanying text (providing an enhanced penalty statute for
hate crime offenders).
159
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liability laws imply that encouraging parents to supervise juveniles is a
legitimate reason to subject parents to liability for juvenile crime.163
Therefore, an enhanced penalty for parents of juvenile hate crime
offenders may be appropriate when an additional criminal punishment
is already imposed on hate crime offenders.164 Part III analyzes the
addition of an enhanced penalty to parental liability laws when juveniles
commit hate crime.165
III. PARENTS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO A PENALTY ENHANCEMENT WHEN
THEIR JUVENILE COMMITS A HATE CRIME
At trial, Hannah and James each receive an enhanced penalty for the
hate crime they committed out of their hatred for Catholics and
homosexuals.166 Hannah’s and James’s victims bring civil suits against
their parents to compensate for the juveniles’ willful and wanton
misconduct.167 However, Hannah’s and James’s victims discover that
the existing parental liability statute failed to reflect the severity of hate
crime and do not provide for an increased penalty against Mr. and Mrs.
Smith and Mr. and Mrs. Jenkins.168 As a result, these laws have failed to
appropriately punish and possibly prevent future hate crimes.
Part III of this Note explains why an enhanced civil penalty for
parental liability is necessary when juveniles commit hate crime.169
Specifically, Part III.A analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of hate
crime legislation and penalty enhancement statutes, while Part III.B
addresses the current benefits of parental liability laws.170 Part III.C.
explores the current defects of parental liability laws and Part III.D
highlights the flaws of such laws as applied to parents of juvenile hate
163
See supra Part II.D (indicating that the purpose of parental liability is to encourage
parents to supervise juvenile delinquents).
164
See infra Part IV.A (adding a civil penalty enhancement to existing parental liability
laws for parents of juvenile hate crime offenders).
165
See infra Part III.
166
See supra note 70 and accompanying text (providing objective criteria to help
determine whether the crime was committed because of a bias).
167
See supra note 145 and accompanying text (indicating that victims can bring a suit
against a juvenile’s parents pursuant to the parental responsibility statute when the
juvenile acts intentionally, willfully, or maliciously).
168
See infra Part IV (adding an additional penalty to exiting parental liability laws for
parents of juvenile hate crime offenders).
169
See infra Part III.
170
See infra Part III.A (establishing that hate crime laws are necessary to reflect the
severity of hate crime and more appropriately punish hate crime offenders); infra Part III.B
(providing that parental liability laws are necessary to encourage parents to supervise
juveniles, but inappropriately reflect the severity of juvenile hate crime).
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crime offenders.171 Finally, Part III.E explains why parents should be
subject to an increased penalty when their juveniles commit hate
crime.172
A. Strengths of Hate Crime and Penalty Enhancement Legislation
Independent legislation for hate crime is necessary to demonstrate
that hate crime is distinguishable from other violent crime.173 Enhanced
penalties are necessary to provide a punishment proportional to the
damage inflicted by hate crime.174 Specifically, enhanced penalties more
appropriately reflect the disproportionate effects of hate crime.175
Statutes that merely define hate crime as a stand-alone crime fail to
impose a punishment that mirrors the offense.176 Hate crime victims
suffer increased psychological and physical effects compared to victims
of ordinary battery.177 The surrounding community also experiences
increased trauma following a hate crime—heightened disturbances that
are absent after the commission of a simple battery.178 Subjecting hate
crime offenders to the same law or punishment as offenders who commit
battery is a blatant disregard of the inherent severity of hate crime.179
Because hate crime is more devastating than other violent crimes, the
punishment, to be proportionate, must be correspondingly more
severe.180 Increased sentences function as deterrents because hate crime
See infra Part III.C (advocating a change in parental liability laws).
See infra Part III.E.
173
See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (providing state statutes that define hate
crime as a new crime and provide a separate penalty). The failure to provide a civil
remedy or statute that criminalizes hate crimes constitutes a legislature’s acceptance of
crime against a particular religion or characteristic, such as race. Gellman, supra note 28, at
341. But see Anne B. Ryan, Comment, Punishing Thought: A Narrative Deconstructing the
Interpretive Dance of Hate Crime Legislation, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 123, 143 (2001) (arguing
that hate crime offenders should only be punished for the underlying offense and not for
the bias motivation).
174
See infra notes 180-86 and accompanying text (analyzing the strengths of enhanced
penalties).
175
See supra Part II.B.1 (describing state hate crime penalty enhancement statutes).
176
See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (providing an example of a statute that
defines a hate crime as a new crime).
177
See supra notes 28-33 (presenting the psychological effects that hate crime victims
suffer).
178
See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text (providing increased effects suffered by
the community after a hate crime).
179
See supra Part II.A.2 (explaining that hate crime is more severe than other violent
crime).
180
FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW 9-10
(1999); McCoy, supra note 28, at 650-55; Wang, supra note 73, at 52-53; Konor Cormier,
Comment, Increase the Peace Means Increase the Penalty?: The Impact of the James Byrd, Jr. Hate
171
172
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offenders are less likely to feel remorse and more likely to be repeat
offenders.181 Statistics from Wisconsin, a state that has a penalty
enhancement statute, are indicative of this notion.182 Specifically, the
number of hate crime offenses regularly exceeded thirty-nine from 19942001, but from 2002-2004, the number never surpassed its earlier high of
thirty nine offenses and has remained steady, demonstrating the overall
deterrent effect of penalty enhancement statutes.183 Enhanced penalty
statutes further protect the public via increased periods of
incarceration.184 Such increases are necessary to promote a sense of
security, and are justified by a decrease in the social harms of retaliation,
a breakdown in community cohesiveness, and disassociation among
society.185 Enhanced penalties also meet the goal of retribution because
they convey society’s disapproval of hate crime.186

Crimes Act in Texas, 34 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 343, 348-49 (2003). In In re Joshua H., 17 Cal. Rptr.
2d 291, 299-300 (Ct. App. 1994), the court stated that:
The “basis” for punishing violent crimes directed against members of a
racial, religious, or other specified group more severely than randomly
inflicted violent crimes is that such crimes inflict greater injury upon
the victim and society at large and existing criminal statutes and
penalties have been inadequate to stop them. This is “the very reason”
those particular acts of violence are additionally punishable.
Id.
181
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 20, at 24-25.
182
See infra note 183 and accompanying text (demonstrating the deterrent effect a penalty
enhancement statute has on the prevalence of hate crime).
183
Specifically, the prevalence of hate crime in Wisconsin, a state that has a hate crime
penalty enhancement statute, has never exceeded sixty-eight offenses in a single year.
OFFICE OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CENTER CRIME AND ARRESTS IN
WISCONSIN: HATE CRIME 111, 212 (2005), available at http://oja.state.wi.us/docview.asp?
docid=4191&locid=97 (last visited Jan. 31, 2007). Wisconsin’s penalty enhancement statute
when into effect May 3, 1988. WIS. STAT. § 939.645 (2005). Wisconsin experienced the most
hate crime in 1992 and the least in 1993. Id. However, the state experienced 41 incidents in
1991, 68 incidents in 1992, 20 incidents in 1993, 39 incidents in 1994, 54 incidents in 1995, 42
incidents in 1996, 57 incidents in 1997, 58 incidents in 1998, 50 incidents in 1999, 51
incidents in 2000, 62 incidents in 2001, 35 incidents in 2002, 36 incidents in 2003, and 39
incidents in 2004. Id. For a comparison to a state with a larger population, Colorado
experienced 123 incidents in 1996, 118 incidents in 1997, 124 incidents in 1998, 146 incidents
in 1999, 98 incidents in 2000, 133 incidents in 2001, 96 incidents in 2002, 81 incidents in 2003,
and 59 incidents in 2004.
Crime in Colorado, http://cbi.state.co.us/dr/cic2k4/
supplemental_reports/hate_crime.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2007). Despite population
differences, it is important to note that Colorado does not have an enhanced penalty statute
for the commission of hate crimes that function to deter offenders from acting on a bias
motivation. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-121 (2005) (bias-motivated crimes). Instead it has a
statute that treats a hate crime as a new crime. Id.
184
Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 20, at 15.
185
Hurd & Moore, supra note 28, at 1091-92. Some argue that those who retaliate deserve
the punishment, but those who caused the retaliation do not deserve to be punished more.
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Hate crime legislation has been upheld against numerous challenges,
indicating that the laws are a constitutional means to achieve the desired
goal of reducing hate crime.187 Hate crime laws can achieve the desired
Penalty
goal of ending hatred and do not punish thought.188
enhancement statutes appropriately punish hate crime offenders for
conduct that is distinguishable from the actions of other violent crime
offenders.189
In addition, hate crime offenders and violent crime offenders should
not be equally punished for their actions.190 Admittedly, although all
offenders are equally responsible for their actions, hate crime and
penalty enhancement statutes are necessary to reflect a central tenent of
criminal law: proportional punishment.191 Because hate crime is more
severe than violent crime, the punishment should be harsher.192
Hate crime legislation, consisting of an increased punishment for
hate crime, should reduce the prevalence of hate crime, thereby
Id. Implicit in the second harm is that the failure to appropriately punish hate crime will
result in a weakened society, including lessened order and civility. Id. However, this
argument is questioned because ordinary crimes can have the same effect on community
stability. Id. Finally, the effects of the last social harm depend on how society responds to
hate crime. Id. Primarily, hate crime causes society to associate more closely with a
particular sexuality, gender, or race. Id. at 1094. However, critics believe that hate crime
laws contribute to social conflicts. Ryan, supra note 173, at 143; Sullaway, supra note 28, at
251. Social conflicts cited include proving bias motivation because of the difficulty of
demonstrating a connection between prejudicial attitudes and behaviors, “punishment of
ideas and attitudes in violation of First Amendment rights, the elevation of hate motives
above other criminal motives as more severe, the creation of a special victim class, the risk
of providing mitigating factors by which an offender can argue for reduced penalties, and
increased intergroup tension as a result of these laws.” Sullaway, supra note 24, at 251.
186
Grannis, supra note 40, at 222.
187
See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (providing constitutional challenges to
hate crime legislation).
188
Robert J. Corry, Jr., Burn this Article: It is Evidence in Your Thought Crime Prosecution, 4
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 461, 487 (2000).
189
See supra notes 173-79 and accompanying text (arguing that hate crime offenders
deserve an enhanced penalty compared to other violent crime offenders).
190
Anthony M. Dillof, The Importance of Being Biased, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1678, 1682 (2000).
The argument is that an assault without a bias motivation is just as wrong as an assault
committed because of a hatred for a particular race, religion or ethnicity. Id.
191
The proportional punishment argument is supported by states that increase the
punishment as the severity of the offence increases. States increase the punishment for a
battery to reflect the severity of the offense. For example, aggravated battery in Illinois is
categorized as a Class one, two, or three felony depending on the amount of injury inflicted
on the victim and the punishment increases accordingly. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-4
(2005).
192
McCoy, supra note 28, at 650-52; see supra notes 28-41 (providing the increased effects
of hate crime on victims and society).
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decreasing the number of victims and communities that suffer from the
heightened effects of hate crime.193 Similarly, parental liability laws that
encourage parents to exert control over juveniles will likely lead to a
reduction in juvenile hate crime when the law provides an appropriate
punishment.194
B. Current Benefits of Parental Liability Laws
Parental liability laws encourage parental supervision and reduce
juvenile delinquency because the amount of control parents exert on
juveniles relates to the probability that juveniles may engage in willful
and wanton misconduct.195 Additionally, because of parental liability
laws, victims of juvenile crime are able to seek redress against the
juveniles’ parents, and victims are protected from irresponsible and
judgment proof delinquents.196
Moreover, because a lack of parental control is a cause of juvenile
hate crime, parental liability laws are necessary to encourage parents to
supervise juveniles and help reduce juvenile hate crime.197 There are
theories that attempt to explain juvenile delinquency, including hate
crime that are classified as biological, anomie, cultural deviance, and
control.198 These theories pose solutions that more appropriately address
the cause of juvenile hate crime than parental liability laws.199 However,
193
See Grannis, supra note 40, at 197 (noting the effect increased punishment should have
on hate crime, through “reduc[ing] the undesirable phenomenon and the resulting
disproportionate victimization”); supra note 183 (showing the deterrent effect Wisconsin’s
penalty enhancement statute has on hate crime offenders).
194
See supra note 183 and accompanying text (providing that enhanced penalties have a
deterrent effect and encourage compliance, thus, enhanced penalties may encourage
parents to further supervise their children due to the threat of additional penalties); infra
Part IV (adding an additional penalty to existing parental liability laws).
195
See infra notes 197-224 and accompanying text (analyzing the parallels between the
control theory and parental liability laws).
196
See infra notes 225-29 and accompanying text (analyzing the strengths of current
parental liability laws).
197
Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 7; see infra notes 197-224 and accompanying text (further
discussing the relationship between the control theory and parental liability laws).
198
The biological theory proposes that there is a link between biological abnormalities
and juvenile delinquency. Chapin, supra note 106, at 665. Another theory, the anomie
theory, maintains that juveniles pursue illegitimate modes to obtain a legitimate result. Id.
at 666. The cultural deviance theory provides that juveniles engage in delinquency,
including hate crime, because juveniles associate with delinquent peers. Id. at 667.
199
Although parents may be a biological cause of juvenile delinquency, parental liability
laws inadequately provide a solution to the biological theory. Parents cannot change the
biological makeup of their children, which is unlike their ability to exert more control over
their children, which is exactly what parental liability laws seek to encourage. A solution
for the anomie theory’s explanation for juvenile delinquency would be educating juveniles
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the control theory provides the social justification for parental liability
laws—what the government views as the contributing factors of juvenile
delinquency and juvenile hate crime—supervision, and control.200
Parental liability laws are thus a legal solution, rooted in the control
theory, for reducing juvenile hate crime.201
More specifically, the control theory, through four elements,
demonstrates that parental liability laws are necessary: attachment,
commitment, involvement, and belief.202 The first element, attachment,
is the most important in illustrating the desirability for parental liability
laws.203 It relates to the bonds juveniles have with their parents.204 A
lack of support and identity results in adolescents’ use of prejudices “to
project unacceptable feelings” resulting in “an intolerance of others and
indignation at the attributed faults.”205 Hatred conveys the juveniles’
feelings of inadequacy due to an absence of parental attachment.206 The
stronger the parental bonds, the easier it is for minors to develop
identities, and the more control parents have over juveniles, the less
about the legal means to obtain a desired result. The education would teach a juvenile
legitimate modes to obtain the desired result, such as working to buy a car instead of
stealing the car. Again, parental liability laws encourage control, which does not
necessarily entail educating the delinquent juvenile. Finally, parental liability laws
inadequately provide a solution to the cultural deviance theory. A somewhat simplified
solution to this theory is to remove the child from his deviant peers. This requires control,
but the sequence of events appears inconsistent with parental liability laws. The child is
removed because the parents exerted control, but parental liability laws should not punish
parents who exert control.
200
The alternative question is whether or not the laws are effective and there is a lack of
empirical, research strongly supporting either position. Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 6.
Opponents of the laws argue that the laws are counterproductive because they unfairly
disadvantage the poor through imposing a fine on a family who struggles financially. Id. at
8. Further, opponents argue there is no reason to punish parents for not controlling
uncontrollable juveniles. Id. at 6.
201
See generally Chapin, supra note 106; Steinberg, supra note 24; Tyler et al., supra note 86;
supra Part II.C.3 (explaining the theories of juvenile delinquency).
202
See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text (presenting the elements of the control
theory).
203
See supra note 116 and accompanying text (providing that a juvenile learns socially
acceptable behavior from the juvenile’s parents).
204
Steinberg, supra note 24, at 985.
Juveniles need parents to discuss fears,
apprehensions, and uncertainties inherent in adolescence. Id. Attachment also relates to
the bonds between juveniles and teachers as well as juveniles and their peers. Id.
205
Id.
206
Id. at 986-87; see Rand D. Conger, Social Control and Social Learning Models of Delinquent
Behavior, 14 CRIMINOLOGY 17 (1976). The research from this study reveals that “particular
parental behaviors which influence the reinforcing value of the home appear to have the
primary influence on delinquent behavior in the parent-child bond.” Id.; see also
Christopher A. Kierkus & Douglas Baer, A Social Control Explanation of the Relationship
Between Family Structure and Delinquent Behaviour, 44 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 425 (2002).
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likely juveniles will engage in delinquent behavior, including hate
crime.207 Conversely, the weaker the bond, the more likely it is that
juveniles will lack identities; the less control parents have over
delinquents, the more likely it is that minors will participate in hate
crime.208 Parents’ abilities to exert an appropriate amount of control over
juveniles is a reflection of attachment between parents and their
juveniles as well as a necessity for parental liability laws.209
The second element, commitment, indicates that juveniles conform
to laws because they are uncertain of the consequences.210 This element
is the most difficult to reconcile with the necessity for parental liability
laws because it is unclear why parents need to further supervise minors
who refrain from engaging in hate crime.211 However, uncertainty of the
consequences is not an absolute guarantee for abstention from juvenile
crime.
Further, continuous parental commitment to supervision
reinforces juveniles’ commitments to conformity and avoidance of
behavior with consequences; it may also further encourage juveniles to
behave in socially acceptable ways and recognize that hatred is
inherently immoral.212 Parents in particular are in a position to explain
why it is wrong to hate, to describe the consequences of acting upon a
bias motivation, to convey the effects hate crime has on victims and
society, and to discuss why retaliation is not a solution to prior
victimization.213 As a result, parental liability laws for juvenile hate
crime are essential for minors because minors are inherently less mature
than adults.214 These laws encourage parents to control juveniles, which

207
See C. Burt, The Causal Factors of Juvenile Crime, 3 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 1 (1923). The results
of the study revealed that the parent-child bond is an environmental factor that has a
significant influence on the likelihood that juveniles will engage in delinquent behavior. Id.
208
See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text (addressing the attachment element of
the control theory).
209
See supra note 116 and accompanying text (learning how to behave appropriately in
society depends on a juvenile’s attachment with peers, teachers, and parents).
210
See supra note 118 and accompanying text (introducing the commitment element of the
control theory).
211
See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text (indicating that an educated juvenile is
less likely to engage in criminal behavior); Part II.D.1 (providing that the purpose of
parental liability laws is to encourage parents to supervise a juvenile delinquent).
212
See supra note 118 and accompanying text (stating that commitment may include
explaining and educating a juvenile about the consequences of inappropriate behavior).
213
See supra notes 28-41 (expanding on the increased effects that a hate crime instills in
the victim and society).
214
See infra note 247 (indicating that parents need to be held liable for juvenile
misconduct because a juvenile lacks the cognitive development that most adults possess).
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The third element, involvement, reduces juveniles’ free time.216
Juveniles are less likely to engage in hate crime because of frustration
and boredom when parents encourage involvement in extracurricular
activities.217 In such a situation, juveniles acquire the social involvement
necessary to understand the inaccuracy of stereotypes about various
races, genders, and religions.218 An absence of involvement can
represent a failure of parents to exert control and encourage parental
supervision.219
The last element of the control theory, belief, indicates that once
juveniles become members of deviant subcultures they surrender
previously held moral beliefs in favor of the prejudices held by the hate
group.220 But juveniles would be less likely to look for acceptance in
deviant peer groups and commit hate crime if parents would provide the
necessary guidance and discipline.221 Parents who supervise adolescents
are better able to monitor those with whom the juveniles associate.222
Thus, the more parental control exerted, the less likely the minors will
befriend others who possess racial, religious, or gender prejudices, and
who are likely to engage in hate crime.223 Due to juveniles’ diminished
responsibility and the desire to provide hate crime victims with redress,

215
See supra note 118 and accompanying text (addressing the commitment element of the
control theory).
216
See supra note 120 and accompanying text (addressing the benefits to participating in
social activities).
217
Steinberg, supra note 24, at 985.
218
Id.
219
See supra Part II.D.1 (providing that the primary goal of parental liability laws is to
encourage parents to supervise juveniles because of the threat that the parents may be held
liable).
220
See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (introducing the belief element of the
control theory).
221
See supra note 123 and accompanying text (indicating that juveniles who associate
with deviant subcultures gradually accept and act on the prejudices of the corresponding
groups).
222
See Cheryl Ann Banachowski-Fuller, Peer Influences, Parental Bonds, School Bonds,
and Perceived Peer Pressure to Commit Delinquent Behavior, 58 Dissertation Abstracts
Int’l Section A: Humanities and Soc. Sci. 2398 (Dec. 1997) (North Carolina State University).
Specifically, research indicates that “the effect of associating with many delinquent friends
on perceived peer pressure is reduced if parents are supportive.” Id.
223
See supra Part II.C.3 (providing the theories of juvenile delinquency which include the
biological, anomie, cultural deviance, and control).
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the penalty should fall on the juveniles’ parents when juveniles engage
in delinquency.224
Parental liability laws are also highly beneficial for the victims of
juvenile hate crime.225 The statutes place losses resulting from hate
crimes on the parents instead of on the victims and protect the victims
from juveniles that are less responsible and unable to satisfy a
judgment.226 Parents are encouraged “[t]o exercise power or influence
over” their children.227 Therefore, increased supervision leads to a
decrease in “juvenile delinquency, vandalism, and malicious
mischief.”228 Parental liability laws are also constitutional means that
serve a government’s legitimate purpose of reducing juvenile
delinquency.229 However, existing laws are defective.230
C. Present Defects of Parental Liability Laws
Specifically, despite the benefits of parental liability laws, further
examination reveals inherent flaws.231 First, limits imposed on recovery
224
See supra notes 144-52 (addressing parental liability that allows victims to recover
against a juvenile’s parents).
225
See infra note 238 and accompanying text (indicating that parental liability laws allow
victims to bring a suit for damages against the parents of juvenile delinquents to protect the
victim from judgment proof juveniles).
226
Wells v. Hickman, 657 N.E.2d 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Hyman v. Davies, 453 N.E.2d
336 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Scott & Grisso, supra note 105, at 172. Skaare argues that the best
solution is to force the parents of juvenile delinquents to pay the victim’s damages rather
than making the victim pay for the loss. Skaare, supra note 138, at 107. The legislative
history of parental civil liability statutes is also indicative. Brank et al., supra note 128, at 7.
A Nebraska Senator noticed the necessity of a statute to reduce the amount of property
damage when youth who destroyed a woman’s property were sent to rehab and the victim
was without a remedy to repair the destroyed items. Id. Subsequently, a statute that
provided parental liability for property damage provided redress and decreased property
destruction. Id. at 8.
227
See Covell v. Olsen, 840 N.E.2d 555 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (noting that parents can be
held liable for negligent supervision because the parents have a duty to prevent juveniles
from intentionally or negligently injuring others); see also Hyman, 453 N.E.2d at 338; Gratz,
supra note 152, at 190 (stating that parental responsibility statutes may “curb juvenile
crime”); supra note 152 and accompanying text (providing the parental liability laws of the
states).
228
Skaare, supra note 138, at 107; see Sutherland v. Roth, 407 So. 2d 139, 140 (Ala. App.
1981).
229
Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d 556, 572 (Neb. 1989).
230
See infra notes 231-34 and accompanying text (providing the defects in existing
parental liability laws).
231
Thurman, supra note 84, at 106. Other critiques include that the laws will increase the
number of emancipated minors when parents relinquish parental rights because of an
inability to control delinquents. Id. The law does not guarantee that the imposition of a
penalty on parents for juvenile misconduct will cause parents to exert more control over
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cause parental liability laws to become less effective.232 Imposing a
$5,000 judgment against parents of juvenile hate crime offenders who
struggle to provide for their family will not further encourage parents to
supervise their juveniles.233 Likewise, the problem is not solved when
parents only pay damages without exerting more control over their
juvenile hate crime offenders.234
D. Flaws of Parental Liability Laws as Applied to Parents of Juvenile Hate
Crime Offenders
Existing parental liability laws are ineffective and inadequately
encourage parents of juvenile hate crime offenders to further
supervise.235 Currently, parental liability statutes limit recovery to a
certain amount of damages, such as $2,500, regardless of the crime
committed by juveniles.236 Yet, the statutes fail to reflect the inherent
severity of hate crime as compared to violent crime already recognized
in enhanced penalty hate crime statutes. 237
Subjecting parents of juvenile hate crime offenders to the same
parental liability laws when their juveniles commit an assault or battery
inadequately redresses a victim for the juveniles’ commission of a hate

delinquents. Davidson, supra note 95, at 24; see Brank et al., supra note 128, at 16-17
(presenting additional arguments in opposition to parental liability laws).
232
Davidson, supra note 85, at 26. For example, some statutes only allow victims to
recover against parents for property damage or personal injuries. Id.; see ALASKA STAT.
§ 34.50.020 (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 577-3.5 (2005) (liability for destruction of property by
minors). But see ALA. CODE § 6-5-380 (2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-661 (2005)
(providing recovery for personal and property damage). Also, as Tyler notes, there is no
purpose to imposing a $5,000 fine on parents to hold them accountable for juvenile
misconduct when the parents already struggling to provide for the family. Tyler et al.,
supra note 86, at 8; see infra Part IV (providing that the penalty imposed should be tailored
to the reason why there is a lack of control instead of simply imposing a fine).
233
See supra notes 195-232; infra notes 234-83 (stating that an additional penalty that
increased the amount of damages recoverable against parents of juvenile hate crime
offenders will likely not further encourage parents to supervise juvenile hate crime
offenders).
234
Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 5.
235
See infra notes 236-44 and accompanying text (discussing the flaws of existing parental
liability laws).
236
See supra note 145 and accompanying text (providing the text of a parental liability
statute under which hate crime, although more severe than violent crime, can still be
classified as willful and wanton conduct).
237
See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing enhanced penalties and why an increased sentence is
necessary for the commission of a hate crime). The belief is that the enhanced penalty will
also function as a further deterrent to juvenile and adult commission of hate crime.
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crime.238 Parents should be subject to a different penalty depending on
whether their juveniles commit hate crime or other violent crime.239
Enhanced penalties are necessary to reflect the notion that hate crime is
different from other violent crime because of the increased effects hate
crimes have on the victims and society.240 Increasing a penalty against
parents would likely decrease the number of hate crimes committed by
juveniles because penalty enhancements in general correlate to lower
hate crime rates.241 To reflect the enhanced criminal hate crime penalty
that seeks to function as a deterrent, parental liability laws should
include similar recognition.242 However, imposing additional fines on
parents who do not know how to properly parent their child or children
inadequately addresses the problem.243 Instead, the more appropriate
would be to require the parents to attend parenting classes to learn how
to supervise and become better role models.244
E. Application of an Enhanced Penalty to Parental Liability Laws for Juvenile
Hate Crime
Adult or juvenile hate crime offenders should receive heightened
penalties to appropriately punish their actions, further deter bias

238
See Hurd & Moore, supra note 28, at 1134. Hurd and Moore argued that the penalty
for the commission of an assault was an insufficient punishment for the commission of an
assault with a bias motivation, stating that “current penalties do not give highly culpable
defendants their due.” Id. at 1135.
239
See infra Part IV.A (providing the text of the additional punishment).
240
See supra Part II.A.1; supra Part II.B.1 and accompanying text (discussing enhanced
penalties and why increased sentences are necessary for the commission of hate crime).
241
See supra note 183 (demonstrating through Wisconsin’s hate crime statistics that
enhanced penalty statutes function as a deterrent and reduce the prevalence of hate crime).
242
See infra Part IV (adding a sentence enhancement feature to existing parental liability
laws to reflect the severity of juvenile hate crime).
243
See supra Part III.A (addressing the strengths and weaknesses of hate crime
legislation).
244
Requiring parents of juvenile hate crime offenders to attend parenting classes may
teach parents the skills necessary to curb juvenile hate crime. Chapin, supra note 106, at
654. California amended its “contributing to the delinquency of a minor” statute to require
parents to exercise reasonable care, supervision, protection, and control over their minor
child. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 2006). Subsequently, the City Attorney’s Office of Los
Angeles has used the statute to force parents to attend parenting classes to reduce juvenile
delinquency. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993); Chapin, supra note 106, at 654.
The Los Angeles parental diversion program was maintained through public resources, not
by the parents themselves. Chapin, supra note 106, at 662. Therefore, along with the
additional penalty, parents of juvenile hate crime offenders that are required to attend
parental training classes will not be responsible for the respective cost. Id.; see infra Part IV
(including parenting classes as one additional punishment).
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motivations, and reflect the inherent severity of hate crime.245 However,
to become whole, the juvenile hate crime victims’ only option is to bring
a civil cause of action against the juveniles’ parents.246 Juveniles are not
completely culpable for their actions, and among other causes of
delinquency, parents are often to blame in some part for juvenile
delinquency because of their lack of control over juvenile offenders.247
Because hatred, such as racism and bigotry, is generally learned, parents
that teach juveniles such hatred to the point it leads to violence should be
held liable.248
An enhanced penalty for parents is a law that more appropriately
encourages parents to supervise juvenile hate crime offenders.249
Ultimately, a parental liability law with an enhanced penalty against the
parents more appropriately reflects and addresses the additional bias
motivation inherent in the hate crime committed by juveniles.250
IV. ENHANCED PENALTY FOR PARENTS OF JUVENILE HATE CRIME
OFFENDERS
Penalty enhancement statutes correctly recognize that hate crimes
are more severe than other violent crime and deserve increased
punishment.251 However, current parental liability laws fail to reflect the
inherent severity of hate crime punished within the criminal law.252 This
Note proposes the addition of a penalty enhancement feature for parents
of juvenile hate crime offenders.253

See supra Part II.B. Steinberg notes that the “penalties for hate crime offenders must
reflect the truly reprehensible nature of their acts.” Steinberg, supra note 24, at 986.
246
See supra Part II.D.1 (including the state parental liability statutes).
247
See supra Part II.C.3 (proving various causes of and theories behind juvenile
delinquency).
248
Steinberg, supra note 24, at 979.
249
See supra Part II.B (providing the states that enacted an enhanced penalty for the
commission of a hate crime and examples of a state statute).
250
See supra notes 152 and accompanying text (addressing parental liability laws and
providing the parental liability laws of the fifty states).
251
See supra Part II.B.1 (pointing out the increased severity of hate crime compared to
other violent crime).
252
See supra note 150 and accompanying text (allowing recovery for different amounts,
depending on the state).
253
See infra notes 254-58 (providing the text of the hate crime penalty enhancement
feature).
245
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A. Proposed Enhancement Feature
The following penalty enhancement feature is a suggested addition
to existing parental liability statutes to further encourage parents to
supervise their juvenile and reduce juvenile hate crime. 254
(A) A parent, parents, or legal guardian of an
unemancipated minor under the age of eighteen (18) is
liable for actual damages to persons or property and is
subject to an additional penalty if:
(1) the juvenile intentionally selected the victim
because of the victim’s actual or perceived disability,
gender, nationality, race or ethnicity, religion, sexual
orientation, or association with a person or group
with one or more of these actual or perceived
characteristics;255
(2) the additional penalty for juvenile’s crime is
determined by:
(a) the amount of supervision the parent actually
exerted over the juvenile; AND
(b) the age of the offender;
(1) twelve (12) years of age and under requires
proof a preponderance of the evidence that the
parents taught the hatred;
(2) thirteen (13) to fifteen (15) requires proof by
clear and convincing evidence that the parents
taught the hatred;
(3) sixteen (16) to seventeen (17) requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that the parents
taught the hatred.
254
The enhancement feature is based on CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.55 (West 2005) (defining
a hate crime) and MO. REV. STAT. § 537.045 (2005) (parent or guardian liable for damages by
minor). The italicized text is the author’s contribution. The first provision in the statute
would solely subject the parents to liability for a juvenile’s ordinary crime. The subsequent
provision includes the enhancement feature to indicate that hate crime is distinct from
violent crime and an additional punishment is necessary.
255
The definition of a hate crime is taken from CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.55 (West 2005),
which is reflective of most statutes.
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(B) The punishment shall include one or more of the
following:
(1) parenting classes;256
(2) family counseling;
(3) educational classes; or257
(4) additional fines.
(C) Upon a finding that the child is uncontrollable and
continues to engage in delinquent behavior, the parents
are exempt from the imposition of any penalty under
this statute.258
B. Commentary
The proposed penalty enhancement feature adopts the standard
definition of hate crime and establishes a separate provision to indicate
that hate crime is distinct from violent crime.259 Like existing parental
liability statutes, the enhancement does not preclude subjecting juveniles
to a criminal punishment for the hate crime nor does it prevent parents
from being held liable for their own negligence.260 The enhancement is

See supra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing parenting classes).
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.014 (Vernon 2005) (requiring hate crime
offenders to attend education classes to familiarize and promote tolerance of different
characteristics). The enhancement feature includes educational classes because juveniles
are not completely responsible for their actions. Further, hate is a learned behavior
commonly taught by parents. If parents are taught tolerance, their children may also
become more accepting.
258
Id. Texas’s statute provides that:
On a finding by the juvenile court or probation department that a
child’s parents or guardians have made a reasonable good faith effort
to prevent the child from engaging in delinquent conduct or engaging
in conduct indicating a need for supervision and that, despite the
parents’ or guardians’ efforts, the child continues to engage in such
conduct, the court or probation department shall waive any sanction
that may be imposed on the parents or guardians at any sanction level.
Id. The addition of a similar provision to the enhancement feature should avoid imposing
an additional penalty on parents whose minor is uncontrollable.
259
See supra Part IV.A (providing the text of the sentence enhancement feature).
260
See supra Part II.C (describing juvenile delinquency).
256
257
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an addition to existing parental liability laws and will apply to all
parents or legal guardians of juvenile hate crime offenders.261
The additional penalty is determined by a combination of factors to
reflect the severity of hate crime.262 The amount of supervision parents
actually exert will help determine the appropriate additional sanction.263
For example, if the parents did not supervise, an examination into the
failure to exercise parental authority will determine the additional
punishment.264 If the parents tried to supervise, further inquiry into why
the attempt was unsuccessful will assist with the imposition of an
appropriate increased penalty.265 Different levels of proof that the
parents taught the hatred are required for different ages because parents’
accountability should change as minors mature and become more
independent.266 Specifically, victims have the burden to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that parents taught their children twelve
and under to hate.267 Preponderance of the evidence is the standard for
children twelve and under because it is likely more probable than not
that parents taught the juveniles to hate.268 However, the origin of
hatred among juveniles thirteen through fifteen is less obvious, and as a
result, the burden is increased to clear and convincing evidence.269
Finally, the standard is beyond a reasonable doubt for juveniles sixteen
and seventeen because it is less certain that parents, not outside
influences or life experience, are the roots of a juvenile’s hatred.270
261
See supra note 254 and accompanying text (adding the enhancement feature to all civil
parental liability laws).
262
See infra text accompanying notes 262-71 (explaining how the additional penalty is
determined).
263
See supra notes 255-58 (providing possible additional penalties).
264
See supra notes 256-57 (providing the possible additional punishments).
265
See supra text accompanying note 256-57 (imposing an additional penalty of parenting
classes, family counseling, educational classes or additional fines).
266
See supra text accompanying notes 255-56 (providing that twelve years of age and
under requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the parents taught the
hatred).
267
See supra text accompanying note 255 (providing that proof by a preponderance of the
evidence is required for children twelve and under).
268
Preponderance of the evidence is defined as “. . . superior evidentiary weight that,
though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to
incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 2004).
269
Clear and convincing evidence is more than a preponderance but less than beyond a
reasonable doubt. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 596 (8th ed. 2004). The standard requires that
“[e]vidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.”
Id.
270
Beyond a reasonable doubt “is that state of the case, which, after the entire
comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/8

Pfeiffer: To Enhance or Not to Enhance: Civil Penalty Enhancements for Par

2007]

Civil Penalty Enhancements

1735

Therefore, the amount of supervision parents actually exerted and the
juvenile’s age will help determine the additional penalty.271
The enhanced penalty for parents of juvenile hate crime offenders
includes alternative sanctions to address both the purpose and flaws of
parental liability statutes, encouraging supervision, and increasing
effectiveness.272 The additional penalty provides a solution that directly
addresses the absence of supervision which allows juveniles to commit
hate crimes.273 For example, to encourage supervision due to an inability
to parent, the enhanced penalty will require the parents to attend
parenting classes with the juvenile to assist in the development of solid
parent-child relationships.274 For another family, an absence of control
may be due to communication problems or unstable relationships
between parents enabling the juvenile to associate with a deviant
subculture.275 Therefore, family counseling may be an appropriate
remedy to increasing supervision over juvenile hate crime offenders.276
If a court determines that the parents taught the juveniles to hate,
parents may be required to attend educational classes to promote
tolerance for the targeted characteristic.277
In addition to holding parents liable for damages for their own
negligence, the enhanced penalty includes the possibility of additional
damages. However, the enhancement should not and is not intended to
disadvantage the already disadvantaged by imposing an additional fine

condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the
truth of the charge.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1293-94 (8th ed. 2004).
271
See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text (providing the various additional
punishments).
272
See supra Part III.B; Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 9-11 (pointing out the flaws and
situations that contribute to the ineffectiveness of parental liability laws).
273
Importantly, the statute seeks to encourage parents to exert an appropriate level of
control over their children because studies indicate that this will lead to a reduction in
juvenile delinquency. Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 13. However, juvenile delinquency
increases at both ends of the spectrum, low and high levels of control. Id.
Attending parenting classes without juveniles only increases the juvenile’s ability to engage
in delinquent behavior. Id. If the only parent of the house has to attend classes, again the
juvenile is left unsupervised and able to engage in misconduct, which may further subject
the parent to increased liability. Id. at 2. In the United States, some of the most common
forms of punishment imposed in the under parental liability statutes include “compulsory
counseling or education programs,” money, or jail sentence. Id.
275
See supra Part IV.A (indicating that counseling may be an appropriate additional
sanction for this situation).
276
See supra Part IV.A (including counseling as an option for an additional punishment).
277
See supra note 258 (providing the text of Texas’s statute that waives liability upon the
finding of a parents good faith attempts to prevent a child from engaging in delinquency).
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on parents who struggle to provide for the family.278 But an additional
fine reflects the criminal law’s treatment of hate crime and may be
appropriate in some situations or as a last resort. Nonetheless, limiting
the additional penalty to those included in the enhancement feature
addresses the flaws of current liability laws for parents of juvenile hate
crime offenders.279
Further, the increased penalty is consistent with the goal of
encouraging parents to supervise their juveniles and reduce juvenile
delinquency.280 The enhancement feature recognizes that some juveniles
are entirely uncontrollable.281 Also, the statute would not encourage
parents to supervise juveniles if the parents will continually be subject to
an enhanced penalty because of uncontrollable juveniles.282 Therefore,
the enhancement feature waives the penalty upon a finding that the
juveniles were completely uncontrollable.283
The penalty enhancement feature is meant to address major issues
among hate crime legislation, penalty enhancement statutes, juvenile
delinquency, and parental liability laws. The statute is reflective of the
severity of hate crime, the necessity of an increased punishment, the
desire to reduce juvenile hate crime, and to further hold parents
accountable for juvenile hate crime offenders.
V. CONCLUSION
Hate crime is inherently more demoralizing than other violent
crimes. Its offenders torture victims because of a prejudice against a
characteristic beyond the victims’ control. As a result, the surrounding
The enhancement feature is designed to address the flaws of parental liability laws
pointed out by Tyler and increase the effectiveness of the laws. For instance, the statute
will not impose a $5,000 fine on a parent or parents who cannot provide food for the
family. Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 8. Further the imposition of a fine is discouraged
because the fine may not appropriately punish the family who is able to pay. Specifically,
“having economic resources can become a poor substitute for the love and affection that
the delinquent child needs.” Id. at 11.
279
See supra Part IV.A (providing the only four possible additional penalties of the
enhancement feature).
280
See supra note 144 and accompanying text (indicating the purpose of parental liability
laws).
281
Juveniles are considered uncontrollable when the parents repeated good faith
attempts to control the juveniles are unsuccessful. Further, the statute is not meant to
imply that bad children result from bad parents. Tyler et al., supra note 86, at 5.
282
See supra Part IV.A (including the text of the sentence enhancement feature).
283
This notion is based on a Texas’s statute that waives sanctions on parents or
guardians. See supra note 285 (proving Texas’s waiver of parental liability upon a finding
of good faith).
278
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community is forced to conceal the targeted characteristic. Therefore,
enhanced penalty statutes are necessary to provide a punishment
proportional to the crime. Parental liability laws fail to include this
recognition; in response, this Note proposes a penalty enhancement
feature to correct the inherent flaws in current parental liability statutes.
Enhanced penalties more appropriately reflect the severity of hate crime
and provide a punishment that directly addresses the quality of
supervision that allows juveniles to commit hate crime.
For example, the enhancement feature more appropriately reflects
the severity of Hannah’s and James’s hate crimes and encourages their
parents to further supervise them. The court applies the penalty
enhancement feature to Mr. and Mrs. Smith and Mr. and Mrs. Jenkins.
As a result, Mr. and Mrs. Smith attend educational classes because they
taught Hannah a hatred for Catholics. The classes expose Mr. and Mrs.
Smith to Catholics in order to facilitate familiarity and acceptance that
will be passed on to Hannah. At the civil trial against Mr. and Mrs.
Jenkins, the court imposes an additional fine and demands family
counseling even though Mr. and Mrs. Jenkins did not teach James his
hatred. The additional fine reflects the enhanced penalty in criminal
statutes and the family counseling should improve communication
among the family and encourage James’s parents to supervise with
whom James associates. Hannah and James learned to hate, but because
they learned to hate, they can also be taught to tolerate.
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